claude-code - 💡(How to fix) Fix Allow trusting writes to ~/.claude/scheduled-tasks/ via permissions config [1 comments, 2 participants]

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anthropics/claude-code#46627Fetched 2026-04-12 13:37:17
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Problem

Writes and edits to files inside ~/.claude/ always require manual confirmation, even when Write(*) and Edit(*) are in the user's settings.json allow list. Adding explicit patterns like Write(~/.claude/**) also doesn't help — the protection appears to be hardcoded.

Impact

This is especially painful for users with scheduled tasks. Each task has a SKILL.md config file under ~/.claude/scheduled-tasks/<task>/SKILL.md. When creating or updating these files (which happens frequently during task management), every write requires manual approval.

Since the rest of ~/.claude/ contains sensitive config (settings.json, credentials.json, etc.), it makes sense to protect those. But scheduled-tasks/ is user content, not system config.

Proposed solution

Allow ~/.claude/scheduled-tasks/** to be covered by the normal permission system (Write(*) / Edit(*) or explicit path globs), while keeping the hardcoded protection for actual config files like settings.json, settings.local.json, credentials.json, etc.

Alternatively, allow users to opt specific subdirectories of ~/.claude/ into the normal permission system via a setting.

extent analysis

TL;DR

Modify the permission system to exempt ~/.claude/scheduled-tasks/** from hardcoded protection, allowing it to be covered by the normal permission rules.

Guidance

  • Review the current implementation of the permission system, specifically the hardcoded protection for ~/.claude/, to understand how it can be modified to exempt certain subdirectories.
  • Consider adding a new setting to allow users to opt specific subdirectories into the normal permission system, providing more flexibility and control.
  • Evaluate the potential security implications of exempting ~/.claude/scheduled-tasks/** from hardcoded protection, ensuring that sensitive config files remain protected.
  • Investigate the possibility of using explicit path globs, such as Write(~/.claude/scheduled-tasks/**), to grant permissions for scheduled tasks while maintaining protection for other config files.

Example

No code example is provided, as the issue does not contain sufficient technical details to generate a specific code snippet.

Notes

The proposed solution requires careful consideration of the security implications and potential trade-offs between flexibility and protection. The hardcoded protection for ~/.claude/ is likely in place to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive config files.

Recommendation

Apply a workaround by modifying the permission system to exempt ~/.claude/scheduled-tasks/** from hardcoded protection, allowing it to be covered by the normal permission rules, as this approach balances the need for flexibility with the requirement to protect sensitive config files.

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