openclaw - 💡(How to fix) Fix [Bug]: Heartbeat fires in Telegram group session, causes permanent delivery failure
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Version: 2026.5.7
What happened: A heartbeat event fired inside a Telegram group session (agent:main:telegram:group:-5281106145) instead of the main session. The group agent correctly responded with HEARTBEAT_OK, but OpenClaw saved this as pendingFinalDelivery: "HEARTBEAT_OK" in sessions.json. This delivery never completed and the session became permanently stuck — all subsequent responses were generated (visible in session transcript and trajectory) but never delivered to Telegram (sendMessage was never called).
Error Message
• /tmp/openclaw/openclaw-2026-05-11.log • /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/agents/main/sessions/5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742.jsonl
{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"}
{"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"}
{"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"}
{"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11810",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}}
{"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "results": [\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 104,\n "endLine": 134,\n "score": 0.6210692473379429,\n "vectorScore": 0.4907763600349426,\n "textScore": 0.9250859843782768,\n "snippet": "- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md",\n "startLine": 152,\n "endLine": 178,\n "score": 0.6055836816220297,\n "vectorScore": 0.4671666622161865,\n "textScore": 0.9285567269023308,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 81,\n "endLine": 111,\n "score": 0.588598970746109,\n "vectorScore": 0.4425526261329651,\n "textScore": 0.9293737748434447,\n "snippet": "What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md",\n "startLine": 127,\n "endLine": 150,\n "score": 0.5498446918436315,\n "vectorScore": 0.3958108425140381,\n "textScore": 0.9092570069460162,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/2026-04-22.md",\n "startLine": 93,\n "endLine": 114,\n "score": 0.3859822154045105,\n "vectorScore": 0.5514031648635864,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": "- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md",\n "startLine": 122,\n "endLine": 144,\n "score": 0.3742120653390884,\n "vectorScore": 0.5345886647701263,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n }\n ],\n "provider": "openai",\n "model": "text-embedding-3-small",\n "citations": "auto",\n "debug": {\n "backend": "builtin",\n "effectiveMode": "n/a",\n "searchMs": 4172,\n "hits": 6\n }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as "just noise to silence"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\"open\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: "used systemd idiot"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}}
{"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}}
{"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}}
{"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}}
{"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\"); [print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}}
{"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}}
{"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\")\n print(f\" {c.get('detail','')}\")\n if c.get('recommendation'):\n print(f\" Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\")\n print()\n"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}}
{"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}}
{"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}}
{"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}}
{"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to groupPolicy=\"open\" on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 groupPolicy="open" on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy="open" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and define channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}}
{"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ok": true,\n "messageId": "11812",\n "chatId": "-5281106145"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}}
{"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}}
{"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11814",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy="open" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from groupPolicy=\"open\" to groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"\n2. Set groupAllowFrom to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+
Root Cause
{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"}
{"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"}
{"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"}
{"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11810",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}}
{"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "results": [\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 104,\n "endLine": 134,\n "score": 0.6210692473379429,\n "vectorScore": 0.4907763600349426,\n "textScore": 0.9250859843782768,\n "snippet": "- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md",\n "startLine": 152,\n "endLine": 178,\n "score": 0.6055836816220297,\n "vectorScore": 0.4671666622161865,\n "textScore": 0.9285567269023308,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 81,\n "endLine": 111,\n "score": 0.588598970746109,\n "vectorScore": 0.4425526261329651,\n "textScore": 0.9293737748434447,\n "snippet": "What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md",\n "startLine": 127,\n "endLine": 150,\n "score": 0.5498446918436315,\n "vectorScore": 0.3958108425140381,\n "textScore": 0.9092570069460162,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/2026-04-22.md",\n "startLine": 93,\n "endLine": 114,\n "score": 0.3859822154045105,\n "vectorScore": 0.5514031648635864,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": "- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md",\n "startLine": 122,\n "endLine": 144,\n "score": 0.3742120653390884,\n "vectorScore": 0.5345886647701263,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n }\n ],\n "provider": "openai",\n "model": "text-embedding-3-small",\n "citations": "auto",\n "debug": {\n "backend": "builtin",\n "effectiveMode": "n/a",\n "searchMs": 4172,\n "hits": 6\n }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as "just noise to silence"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\"open\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: "used systemd idiot"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}}
{"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}}
{"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}}
{"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}}
{"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\"); [print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}}
{"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}}
{"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\")\n print(f\" {c.get('detail','')}\")\n if c.get('recommendation'):\n print(f\" Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\")\n print()\n"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}}
{"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}}
{"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}}
{"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}}
{"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to groupPolicy=\"open\" on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 groupPolicy="open" on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy="open" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and define channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}}
{"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ok": true,\n "messageId": "11812",\n "chatId": "-5281106145"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}}
{"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}}
{"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11814",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy="open" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from groupPolicy=\"open\" to groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"\n2. Set groupAllowFrom to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+
Fix Action
Fix / Workaround
{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"}
{"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"}
{"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"}
{"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11810",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}}
{"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "results": [\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 104,\n "endLine": 134,\n "score": 0.6210692473379429,\n "vectorScore": 0.4907763600349426,\n "textScore": 0.9250859843782768,\n "snippet": "- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md",\n "startLine": 152,\n "endLine": 178,\n "score": 0.6055836816220297,\n "vectorScore": 0.4671666622161865,\n "textScore": 0.9285567269023308,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 81,\n "endLine": 111,\n "score": 0.588598970746109,\n "vectorScore": 0.4425526261329651,\n "textScore": 0.9293737748434447,\n "snippet": "What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md",\n "startLine": 127,\n "endLine": 150,\n "score": 0.5498446918436315,\n "vectorScore": 0.3958108425140381,\n "textScore": 0.9092570069460162,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/2026-04-22.md",\n "startLine": 93,\n "endLine": 114,\n "score": 0.3859822154045105,\n "vectorScore": 0.5514031648635864,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": "- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md",\n "startLine": 122,\n "endLine": 144,\n "score": 0.3742120653390884,\n "vectorScore": 0.5345886647701263,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n }\n ],\n "provider": "openai",\n "model": "text-embedding-3-small",\n "citations": "auto",\n "debug": {\n "backend": "builtin",\n "effectiveMode": "n/a",\n "searchMs": 4172,\n "hits": 6\n }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as "just noise to silence"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\"open\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: "used systemd idiot"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}}
{"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}}
{"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}}
{"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}}
{"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\"); [print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}}
{"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}}
{"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\")\n print(f\" {c.get('detail','')}\")\n if c.get('recommendation'):\n print(f\" Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\")\n print()\n"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}}
{"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}}
{"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}}
{"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}}
{"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to groupPolicy=\"open\" on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 groupPolicy="open" on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy="open" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and define channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}}
{"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ok": true,\n "messageId": "11812",\n "chatId": "-5281106145"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}}
{"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}}
{"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11814",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy="open" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from groupPolicy=\"open\" to groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"\n2. Set groupAllowFrom to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+
Code Example
• /tmp/openclaw/openclaw-2026-05-11.log
• /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/agents/main/sessions/5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742.jsonl
{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"}
{"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"}
{"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"}
{"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n \"chat_id\": \"telegram:-5281106145\",\n \"message_id\": \"11810\",\n \"sender_id\": \"8094726582\",\n \"conversation_label\": \"OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145\",\n \"sender\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n \"timestamp\": \"Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT\",\n \"group_subject\": \"OpenClaw Config\",\n \"is_group_chat\": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n \"label\": \"Kevin Melberger (8094726582)\",\n \"id\": \"8094726582\",\n \"name\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n \"username\": \"Kevin_IBT\"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about \"Critical audits found??\" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}}
{"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns \"audit\".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns \"audit\".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n \"results\": [\n {\n \"path\": \"MEMORY.md\",\n \"startLine\": 104,\n \"endLine\": 134,\n \"score\": 0.6210692473379429,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.4907763600349426,\n \"textScore\": 0.9250859843782768,\n \"snippet\": \"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \\\"just noise to silence\\\"\\n- Gave a command without reading current config\\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\\n\\n**What happened:**\\n- Kevin ran the command\\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\\n- `groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"` + elevated tools = **any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands**\\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\\n\\n**The lesson:**\\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\\n- I read them \",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md\",\n \"startLine\": 152,\n \"endLine\": 178,\n \"score\": 0.6055836816220297,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.4671666622161865,\n \"textScore\": 0.9285567269023308,\n \"snippet\": \" - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"MEMORY.md\",\n \"startLine\": 81,\n \"endLine\": 111,\n \"score\": 0.588598970746109,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.4425526261329651,\n \"textScore\": 0.9293737748434447,\n \"snippet\": \"**What I did wrong:**\\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\\n- I killed `run_preplan.py` directly with `pkill`/`kill`\\n- I did **not** check whether PrePlan was managed by `systemd`\\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \\\"used systemd idiot\\\"\\n\\n**Why this matters:**\\n- If a service is managed by `systemd`, the correct control point is the service unit\\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\\n\\n**The rule:**\\n1. **Check for service management first** (`systemctl status ...`, user service if a\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md\",\n \"startLine\": 127,\n \"endLine\": 150,\n \"score\": 0.5498446918436315,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.3958108425140381,\n \"textScore\": 0.9092570069460162,\n \"snippet\": \" - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has `2026.4.26` available via `openclaw update status`. - Local security audit looked basi\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"memory/2026-04-22.md\",\n \"startLine\": 93,\n \"endLine\": 114,\n \"score\": 0.3859822154045105,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.5514031648635864,\n \"textScore\": 0,\n \"snippet\": \"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md\",\n \"startLine\": 122,\n \"endLine\": 144,\n \"score\": 0.3742120653390884,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.5345886647701263,\n \"textScore\": 0,\n \"snippet\": \" - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n }\n ],\n \"provider\": \"openai\",\n \"model\": \"text-embedding-3-small\",\n \"citations\": \"auto\",\n \"debug\": {\n \"backend\": \"builtin\",\n \"effectiveMode\": \"n/a\",\n \"searchMs\": 4172,\n \"hits\": 6\n }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\n**What happened:**\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- `groupPolicy=\"open\"` + elevated tools = **any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands**\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\n**The lesson:**\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"**What I did wrong:**\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed `run_preplan.py` directly with `pkill`/`kill`\n- I did **not** check whether PrePlan was managed by `systemd`\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\n**Why this matters:**\n- If a service is managed by `systemd`, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\n**The rule:**\n1. **Check for service management first** (`systemctl status ...`, user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has `2026.4.26` available via `openclaw update status`. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about \"Critical audits found??\" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}}
{"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}}
{"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}}
{"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}}
{"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c \"import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\\\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\\\"); [print(f\\\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\\\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]\"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}}
{"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}}
{"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c \"\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n print(f\\\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\\\")\n print(f\\\" {c.get('detail','')}\\\")\n if c.get('recommendation'):\n print(f\\\" Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\\\")\n print()\n\"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}}
{"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}}
{"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}}
{"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n \"ts\": 1778512181399,\n \"summary\": {\n \"critical\": 3,\n \"warn\": 3,\n \"info\": 1\n },\n \"findings\": [\n {\n \"checkId\": \"summary.attack_surface\",\n \"severity\": \"info\",\n \"title\": \"Attack surface summary\",\n \"detail\": \"groups: open=1, allowlist=0\\ntools.elevated: enabled\\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\\nhooks.internal: disabled\\nbrowser control: enabled\\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"gateway.trusted_proxies_missing\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Reverse proxy headers are not trusted\",\n \"detail\": \"gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.\",\n \"remediation\": \"Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled\",\n \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.\",\n \"remediation\": \"Set groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed\",\n \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.\",\n \"remediation\": \"For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\\\"messaging\\\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\" for exposed agents.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)\",\n \"detail\": \"Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"\\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.\",\n \"remediation\": \"If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs\",\n \"detail\": \"Unpinned plugin index install records:\\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)\",\n \"remediation\": \"Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/[email protected]`) for higher supply-chain stability.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"channels.telegram.warning.1\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Telegram security warning\",\n \"detail\": \"Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders.\"\n }\n ],\n \"deep\": {\n \"gateway\": {\n \"attempted\": true,\n \"url\": \"ws://127.0.0.1:18789\",\n \"ok\": true,\n \"error\": null,\n \"close\": null\n }\n },\n \"secretDiagnostics\": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n \"ts\": 1778512181399,\n \"summary\": {\n \"critical\": 3,\n \"warn\": 3,\n \"info\": 1\n },\n \"findings\": [\n {\n \"checkId\": \"summary.attack_surface\",\n \"severity\": \"info\",\n \"title\": \"Attack surface summary\",\n \"detail\": \"groups: open=1, allowlist=0\\ntools.elevated: enabled\\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\\nhooks.internal: disabled\\nbrowser control: enabled\\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"gateway.trusted_proxies_missing\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Reverse proxy headers are not trusted\",\n \"detail\": \"gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.\",\n \"remediation\": \"Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled\",\n \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.\",\n \"remediation\": \"Set groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed\",\n \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.\",\n \"remediation\": \"For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\\\"messaging\\\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\" for exposed agents.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)\",\n \"detail\": \"Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"\\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.\",\n \"remediation\": \"If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs\",\n \"detail\": \"Unpinned plugin index install records:\\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)\",\n \"remediation\": \"Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/[email protected]`) for higher supply-chain stability.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"channels.telegram.warning.1\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Telegram security warning\",\n \"detail\": \"Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders.\"\n }\n ],\n \"deep\": {\n \"gateway\": {\n \"attempted\": true,\n \"url\": \"ws://127.0.0.1:18789\",\n \"ok\": true,\n \"error\": null,\n \"close\": null\n }\n },\n \"secretDiagnostics\": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}}
{"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to `groupPolicy=\"open\"` on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 **groupPolicy=\"open\"** on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set `channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"` and define `channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom` with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}}
{"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n \"ok\": true,\n \"messageId\": \"11812\",\n \"chatId\": \"-5281106145\"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}}
{"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}}
{"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n \"chat_id\": \"telegram:-5281106145\",\n \"message_id\": \"11814\",\n \"sender_id\": \"8094726582\",\n \"conversation_label\": \"OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145\",\n \"sender\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n \"timestamp\": \"Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT\",\n \"group_subject\": \"OpenClaw Config\",\n \"is_group_chat\": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n \"label\": \"Kevin Melberger (8094726582)\",\n \"id\": \"8094726582\",\n \"name\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n \"username\": \"Kevin_IBT\"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy=\"open\" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from `groupPolicy=\"open\"` to `groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"`\n2. Set `groupAllowFrom` to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+RAW_BUFFERClick to expand / collapse
Bug type
Behavior bug (incorrect output/state without crash)
Beta release blocker
No
Summary
Version: 2026.5.7
What happened: A heartbeat event fired inside a Telegram group session (agent:main:telegram:group:-5281106145) instead of the main session. The group agent correctly responded with HEARTBEAT_OK, but OpenClaw saved this as pendingFinalDelivery: "HEARTBEAT_OK" in sessions.json. This delivery never completed and the session became permanently stuck — all subsequent responses were generated (visible in session transcript and trajectory) but never delivered to Telegram (sendMessage was never called).
Steps to reproduce
Steps to reproduce (observed conditions, not guaranteed):
- Have an active Telegram group session with recent message history
- Run a jq command to modify groupPolicy in openclaw.json while the group session is active
- OpenClaw detects config change and attempts a deferred channel reload (logged: "config change requires channel reload — deferring until operations complete")
- Gateway times out during the reload (logged: "Failed with result 'timeout'")
- Gateway restarts automatically
- On restart, heartbeat fires inside the group session instead of main session
- Group session responds HEARTBEAT_OK
- sessions.json records pendingFinalDelivery: true, pendingFinalDeliveryText: "HEARTBEAT_OK"
- Delivery gets permanently stuck — all subsequent group responses silently dropped
Note: The exact trigger for heartbeat misfiring into the group session is unknown. It may be related to the gateway timeout + config reload race condition. We cannot guarantee these steps reproduce it reliably.
Expected behavior
- Have a Telegram group session active
- Heartbeat fires at the wrong time (appears to target the group session instead of main)
- Group session responds HEARTBEAT_OK
- pendingFinalDelivery: true, pendingFinalDeliveryText: "HEARTBEAT_OK" persists in sessions.json
- Gateway restart does not clear it (flag survives restart from disk)
- All future group messages: model runs, response generated, but no Telegram delivery
Actual behavior
Telegram group OpenClaw Config (-5281106145) stopped delivering responses. The bot showed a "typing" indicator in Telegram when messages were sent, confirming the session was triggered. The session transcript confirms the model ran and generated a response (e.g., "Still here. 👍", 9 output tokens). The trajectory log shows model.completed → trace.artifacts → session.ended with no delivery step. Gateway logs show zero sendMessage calls to chat -5281106145. The sessions.json entry for that group contained pendingFinalDelivery: true, pendingFinalDeliveryText: "HEARTBEAT_OK". A gateway restart did not resolve it — the flag persisted on disk. Clearing the flag via jq also did not restore delivery. The only fix was deleting the session entry from sessions.json entirely, forcing a fresh session on the next message.
OpenClaw version
2026.5.7
Operating system
AWS Linux 2023 Graviton (ARM)
Install method
install -g openclaw
Model
anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6
Provider / routing chain
openclaw -> anthropic (direct, token auth)
Additional provider/model setup details
Default route: openclaw -> anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6 via anthropic:default (token auth). Fallbacks configured: openai-codex/gpt-5.4, openai/gpt-5.4. Config: ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json under agents.defaults.model. No proxy or AI gateway in use. Direct Anthropic API.
Logs, screenshots, and evidence
• /tmp/openclaw/openclaw-2026-05-11.log
• /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/agents/main/sessions/5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742.jsonl
{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"}
{"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"}
{"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"}
{"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n \"chat_id\": \"telegram:-5281106145\",\n \"message_id\": \"11810\",\n \"sender_id\": \"8094726582\",\n \"conversation_label\": \"OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145\",\n \"sender\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n \"timestamp\": \"Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT\",\n \"group_subject\": \"OpenClaw Config\",\n \"is_group_chat\": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n \"label\": \"Kevin Melberger (8094726582)\",\n \"id\": \"8094726582\",\n \"name\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n \"username\": \"Kevin_IBT\"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about \"Critical audits found??\" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}}
{"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns \"audit\".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns \"audit\".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n \"results\": [\n {\n \"path\": \"MEMORY.md\",\n \"startLine\": 104,\n \"endLine\": 134,\n \"score\": 0.6210692473379429,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.4907763600349426,\n \"textScore\": 0.9250859843782768,\n \"snippet\": \"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \\\"just noise to silence\\\"\\n- Gave a command without reading current config\\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\\n\\n**What happened:**\\n- Kevin ran the command\\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\\n- `groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"` + elevated tools = **any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands**\\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\\n\\n**The lesson:**\\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\\n- I read them \",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md\",\n \"startLine\": 152,\n \"endLine\": 178,\n \"score\": 0.6055836816220297,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.4671666622161865,\n \"textScore\": 0.9285567269023308,\n \"snippet\": \" - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"MEMORY.md\",\n \"startLine\": 81,\n \"endLine\": 111,\n \"score\": 0.588598970746109,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.4425526261329651,\n \"textScore\": 0.9293737748434447,\n \"snippet\": \"**What I did wrong:**\\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\\n- I killed `run_preplan.py` directly with `pkill`/`kill`\\n- I did **not** check whether PrePlan was managed by `systemd`\\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \\\"used systemd idiot\\\"\\n\\n**Why this matters:**\\n- If a service is managed by `systemd`, the correct control point is the service unit\\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\\n\\n**The rule:**\\n1. **Check for service management first** (`systemctl status ...`, user service if a\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md\",\n \"startLine\": 127,\n \"endLine\": 150,\n \"score\": 0.5498446918436315,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.3958108425140381,\n \"textScore\": 0.9092570069460162,\n \"snippet\": \" - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has `2026.4.26` available via `openclaw update status`. - Local security audit looked basi\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"memory/2026-04-22.md\",\n \"startLine\": 93,\n \"endLine\": 114,\n \"score\": 0.3859822154045105,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.5514031648635864,\n \"textScore\": 0,\n \"snippet\": \"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n },\n {\n \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md\",\n \"startLine\": 122,\n \"endLine\": 144,\n \"score\": 0.3742120653390884,\n \"vectorScore\": 0.5345886647701263,\n \"textScore\": 0,\n \"snippet\": \" - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\\n - confidence: 0.58\\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\\n - recalls: 0\\n - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3\",\n \"source\": \"memory\",\n \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n }\n ],\n \"provider\": \"openai\",\n \"model\": \"text-embedding-3-small\",\n \"citations\": \"auto\",\n \"debug\": {\n \"backend\": \"builtin\",\n \"effectiveMode\": \"n/a\",\n \"searchMs\": 4172,\n \"hits\": 6\n }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\n**What happened:**\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- `groupPolicy=\"open\"` + elevated tools = **any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands**\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\n**The lesson:**\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"**What I did wrong:**\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed `run_preplan.py` directly with `pkill`/`kill`\n- I did **not** check whether PrePlan was managed by `systemd`\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\n**Why this matters:**\n- If a service is managed by `systemd`, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\n**The rule:**\n1. **Check for service management first** (`systemctl status ...`, user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has `2026.4.26` available via `openclaw update status`. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about \"Critical audits found??\" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}}
{"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}}
{"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}}
{"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}}
{"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c \"import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\\\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\\\"); [print(f\\\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\\\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]\"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}}
{"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}}
{"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c \"\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n print(f\\\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\\\")\n print(f\\\" {c.get('detail','')}\\\")\n if c.get('recommendation'):\n print(f\\\" Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\\\")\n print()\n\"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}}
{"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}}
{"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}}
{"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n \"ts\": 1778512181399,\n \"summary\": {\n \"critical\": 3,\n \"warn\": 3,\n \"info\": 1\n },\n \"findings\": [\n {\n \"checkId\": \"summary.attack_surface\",\n \"severity\": \"info\",\n \"title\": \"Attack surface summary\",\n \"detail\": \"groups: open=1, allowlist=0\\ntools.elevated: enabled\\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\\nhooks.internal: disabled\\nbrowser control: enabled\\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"gateway.trusted_proxies_missing\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Reverse proxy headers are not trusted\",\n \"detail\": \"gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.\",\n \"remediation\": \"Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled\",\n \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.\",\n \"remediation\": \"Set groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed\",\n \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.\",\n \"remediation\": \"For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\\\"messaging\\\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\" for exposed agents.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)\",\n \"detail\": \"Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"\\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.\",\n \"remediation\": \"If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs\",\n \"detail\": \"Unpinned plugin index install records:\\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)\",\n \"remediation\": \"Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/[email protected]`) for higher supply-chain stability.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"channels.telegram.warning.1\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Telegram security warning\",\n \"detail\": \"Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders.\"\n }\n ],\n \"deep\": {\n \"gateway\": {\n \"attempted\": true,\n \"url\": \"ws://127.0.0.1:18789\",\n \"ok\": true,\n \"error\": null,\n \"close\": null\n }\n },\n \"secretDiagnostics\": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n \"ts\": 1778512181399,\n \"summary\": {\n \"critical\": 3,\n \"warn\": 3,\n \"info\": 1\n },\n \"findings\": [\n {\n \"checkId\": \"summary.attack_surface\",\n \"severity\": \"info\",\n \"title\": \"Attack surface summary\",\n \"detail\": \"groups: open=1, allowlist=0\\ntools.elevated: enabled\\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\\nhooks.internal: disabled\\nbrowser control: enabled\\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"gateway.trusted_proxies_missing\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Reverse proxy headers are not trusted\",\n \"detail\": \"gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.\",\n \"remediation\": \"Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled\",\n \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.\",\n \"remediation\": \"Set groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed\",\n \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.\",\n \"remediation\": \"For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\\\"messaging\\\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\" for exposed agents.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)\",\n \"detail\": \"Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"\\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.\",\n \"remediation\": \"If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs\",\n \"severity\": \"warn\",\n \"title\": \"Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs\",\n \"detail\": \"Unpinned plugin index install records:\\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)\",\n \"remediation\": \"Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/[email protected]`) for higher supply-chain stability.\"\n },\n {\n \"checkId\": \"channels.telegram.warning.1\",\n \"severity\": \"critical\",\n \"title\": \"Telegram security warning\",\n \"detail\": \"Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders.\"\n }\n ],\n \"deep\": {\n \"gateway\": {\n \"attempted\": true,\n \"url\": \"ws://127.0.0.1:18789\",\n \"ok\": true,\n \"error\": null,\n \"close\": null\n }\n },\n \"secretDiagnostics\": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}}
{"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to `groupPolicy=\"open\"` on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 **groupPolicy=\"open\"** on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set `channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"` and define `channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom` with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}}
{"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n \"ok\": true,\n \"messageId\": \"11812\",\n \"chatId\": \"-5281106145\"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}}
{"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}}
{"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n \"chat_id\": \"telegram:-5281106145\",\n \"message_id\": \"11814\",\n \"sender_id\": \"8094726582\",\n \"conversation_label\": \"OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145\",\n \"sender\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n \"timestamp\": \"Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT\",\n \"group_subject\": \"OpenClaw Config\",\n \"is_group_chat\": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n \"label\": \"Kevin Melberger (8094726582)\",\n \"id\": \"8094726582\",\n \"name\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n \"username\": \"Kevin_IBT\"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy=\"open\" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from `groupPolicy=\"open\"` to `groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"`\n2. Set `groupAllowFrom` to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+Impact and severity
Affected: Any Telegram group session where a heartbeat fires during an active group session window.
Severity: High — the group session becomes permanently unresponsive with no visible error. The bot shows a typing indicator but never delivers a response.
Frequency: Intermittent. Occurred once on 2026-05-11 on version 2026.5.7. Conditions appear to require an active group session + heartbeat misfire coinciding.
Consequence: All subsequent messages to the affected group are silently dropped. Model runs,
Additional information
No response
Vote matrix · Quick signals
FAQ
Expected behavior
- Have a Telegram group session active
- Heartbeat fires at the wrong time (appears to target the group session instead of main)
- Group session responds HEARTBEAT_OK
- pendingFinalDelivery: true, pendingFinalDeliveryText: "HEARTBEAT_OK" persists in sessions.json
- Gateway restart does not clear it (flag survives restart from disk)
- All future group messages: model runs, response generated, but no Telegram delivery
Still need to ship something?
×6Another batch ranked right after the header list — different links, same matching logic.
TRENDING
- Feature Request: Configurable per-minute rate limiting (RPM) for models to prevent 429 errors
- Android: Hermes App + Termux install share ~/.hermes and cause silent permission loops
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- hermes update downgrades aiohttp from 3.13.4 to 3.13.3
- npm install warns about deprecated @babel/plugin-proposal-private-methods
- DingTalk inbound media URLs are skipped as unreadable native image paths
- fix(dashboard): ChatPage clears header action buttons on ALL pages, not just Sessions
- [Bug]: check_web_api_key() hardcodes built-in backends — third-party web search plugins silently disabled
- Hermes Web UI 修复经验:GatewayManager 补丁、进程 D 状态、数据库升级问题
- Telegram gateway can silently drop turn after /stop with response=0 chars while internal work continues
- Bug Report: v0.14.0 上下文污染 — 历史回复碎片回注到新请求
- Bug: hermes skills search table truncates Identifier column — install fails with copied value
- [skills-index-watchdog] Skills index is stale or degraded (degraded)
- Discord approval embed not rendering on web/mobile — embed data present in API but invisible
- Idea: Discord voice-channel participation / opt-in auto-join mode
- [Feature]: Claude Code--ultrawork
- build-arm64 job deterministically fails on cold cache (Azure SAS token expires mid-build)
- [Enhancement] computer_use: action=type should fall back to key events for terminal emulators (Ghostty/Terminal.app/iTerm2)
- Feature Request: Session Recovery on Temporary Provider Outage
- [Bug]: Hermes dashboard not working on NixOS (container)
- [Feature]: Add option to ignore @all/@everyone mentions in Feishu group chats
- QQ Bot WebSocket 频繁断开:长时间工具执行阻塞 asyncio 事件循环导致心跳超时
- patch tool: new_string escape sequences (\t) get written literally
- Feature Request: i18n / 多语言支持(国际化)
- Bug: web_crawl schema lets models auto-guess "instructions" instead of asking the user via clarify
- feat: `!command` prefix for direct shell execution (like Claude Code)
- Expose currently-running cron jobs via /api/jobs (or new endpoint)
- [Bug]: Kanban parent-child handoff: scratch workspace GC destroys artifacts before child can read them
- [Bug, Windows] hermes gateway restart loses session context — planned_stop_marker not written before SIGTERM
- [Bug]: Codex→DeepSeek fallback sends assistant turns without reasoning_content → HTTP 400 (require-side cross-provider failover)
- [Bug]: Update got stuck half way, reboot it, then ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'hermes_cli'
- Kanban dispatcher corrupt-board handling and multi-profile gateway ownership ambiguity
- Gateway can resend a short fallback message when the real final Telegram response was already delivered
- [BUG] Bedrock: Fix 'Invalid API Key format' for presigned URL tokens
- Secret redaction corrupts code syntax in tool output (write_file, execute_code, terminal)
- Unable to connect Ollama Cloud with Pro Subscription to Hermes
- feat: fuzzy substring matching for /skill autocomplete
- PRD: Autonomous market-impact prediction briefing system
- Kanban dashboard should support task/card deep links
- [Feature] Native Feishu CardKit Streaming: consolidate best-in-class implementations
- [Feature]: Inject mental model into context when using Hindsight
- Interactive CLI hides tool output despite display.tool_progress=all, and hermes chat -v does not restore it
- fix(api_server): _handle_responses drops text.format JSON schema — structured output constraints silently ignored
- state.db FTS corruption goes undetected — no integrity check, no repair path
- bug: fallback routing can select text-only models for image requests and hide the primary failure
- feat(kanban): persist worker session_id per run and pass --resume on respawn after unblock
- feat(kanban): support GitHub/OMO lifecycle bridge for Xiyou-style automation
- Expose update-safe TUI/composer hooks for voice transcript and composer events
- Hide or configure voice transcript status rows in editable dictation mode
- [Feature]: Per-Tool / Per-Toolset Approval Policies
- Context compression creates orphan sessions missing from state.db
- messaging platform
- feat: Add read-only / silent monitoring mode for WhatsApp adapter
- double-.hermes path mismatch, the HOME env var leak, and the fallback-notification UX problem
- Bug: Plattform-Bundle name `hermes-yuanbao` in `agent.disabled_toolsets` silently kills ALL tools in gateway path (Telegram + cron), CLI unaffected
- CLI /yolo (in-chat) does not bypass dangerous command approvals — env var freeze + missing enable_session_yolo call
- OpenAI Codex provider crashes with "'NoneType' object is not iterable" (HTTP None)
- DEEPSEEK_API_KEY blocked by env blocklist in gateway process — cron jobs fail with deepseek provider
- fix(feishu): Card action callback routing issues - invalid message_id and unrecognized /card command
- Discord plugin: profiles without explicit `discord:` block silently get `require_mention=true` + `auto_thread=true` (regression in cc8e5ec2a)
- [Bug]: DISCORD_ALLOWED_ROLES ignored by gateway _is_user_authorized — role-authorized users get 'Unauthorized user' rejection
- [Bug]: /new, /clear, and /reset commands freeze the terminal session
- openai-codex subscription backend returns HTTP 200 with response.output=None, causing Slack/cron failures
- RFC: Centralized Model/Provider Registry
- bug: openai-codex provider — TypeError: 'NoneType' object is not iterable on every request (gpt-5.5)
- [Feature]: Source-aware instruction gate — architectural mitigation for indirect prompt injection
- Named custom provider stale_timeout_seconds ignored because runtime provider is normalized to `custom`
- guard test (ignore)
- [Feature]: per-platform LLM request_overrides (extra_body / reasoning_effort / service_tier)
- One-shot smoke: add Flue-backed orchestration fixture
- Gateway should not treat stale Codex app-server progress as final response after post-tool silence
- `docker_run_as_host_user: true` breaks bundled skills: Hermes home is mounted into `/root/.hermes` but the container runs as a non-root user (`HOME=/home/pn`)
- [Bug]: gateway api_server streaming bypasses server-side tool-call loop when chat_template_kwargs.enable_thinking=false (model emits tool name as plain text)
- [Feature]: Pre-install python-telegram-bot in Umbrel Hermes Docker image
- YouTube Shorts filter not working in youtube-content skill
- v0.15.0 PyPI release breaks ALL platforms — plugin.yaml manifests missing from package
- RFC: On-demand tool/skill/MCP discovery — decouple schema registration from process lifecycle
- Pixshelf: local-first stock photo workflow command center
- [Bug]: baoyu infographic skill should not silently bypass image_generate
- Pixshelf v1.5: manual submission tracking for stock agencies
- `hermes config set` silently accepts unknown keys, writing them where the runtime never reads
- Honcho memory prefetch hang on fresh CLI subprocess in v0.15.0 (regression from #27190)
- [Bug] v0.15.0 Docker image: stage2-hook.sh, main-wrapper.sh missing; container_boot module removed
- Feature: Reduce cache-read token overhead for DeepSeek providers — configurable cache_ttl, skills snapshot trimming, memory compaction
- Windows: three bugs from daily use (plugin discovery, gateway exit code, Unicode decode
- holographic memory: HRR silently degrades to FTS5 when numpy is missing
- Make max_tokens configurable for aux vision calls
- Conversation compression desynchronizes session ID between agent context and gateway routing, causing silent message loss
- [Bug]: v0.15.0 Docker image:The TUI cannot be used in the dashboard.
- cron: skip_memory=True blocks fact_store/memory tools from all cron jobs
- TUI: Node.js OOM crash when agent uses browser tools repeatedly
- feat: model_profiles — per-model toolset and memory config
- Automatic background skill patching disrupts active sessions (severe impact on local models)
- ensure_hermes_home() creates root-owned dirs in profile subdirectories when kanban workers are dispatched
- Feature: opt-in webhook bypass for DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS — allow operator-initiated probes without weakening bot-loop guard
- v0.15.0: Codex requests fail HTTP 400 when participant display_name contains non-ASCII (emoji breaks input[].name pattern)
- Architecture: State Persistence Precedence (Memory vs Skills vs Hooks)
- [Bug]: cronjob tool: create action always fails with "schedule is required for create" even when parameters are provided
- codex-oauth: 'NoneType' object is not iterable in _run_codex_stream (gpt-5.5) — every turn fails non-retryably
- Docs/Config: Plugin local scope enablement ambiguity
- [Bug]: CLI freezes after using /new command (WSL)
- Profile Codex auth can ignore global credential pool when local state is stale
- [workflow-engine] CRITICAL: variable substitution crashes on regex metachars in user input
- [workflow-engine] HIGH: loop and bash nodes leak subprocesses on timeout
- [workflow-engine] HIGH: README documents config env vars the engine never reads
- [workflow-engine] MEDIUM: workflow_run rate limit bypassable via concurrent calls (TOCTOU)
- [workflow-engine] chore: manifest gaps, side-effectful register(), dead code, unauth kanban dispatch
- [mcp_lazy] HIGH: synthetic mcp_server_<name> stub collides with a real MCP server named 'server'
- [mcp_lazy] HIGH: promote_server eager flag documented but never persisted
- [mcp_lazy] MEDIUM: _prev_mode dict leaks and goes stale; not cleared on session evict
- [mcp_lazy] MEDIUM: get_pool has unlocked check-then-set race on pool creation
- [mcp_lazy] MEDIUM: pre_tool_call gives no guidance for unpromoted server-stub calls
- [mcp_lazy] chore: undeclared pre_tool_call hook, nonexistent 'mcp_load_tools' name in docs, missing tests
- [a2a_fleet] CRITICAL: server never auto-starts — register() runs outside an event loop
- [a2a_fleet] CRITICAL: auth_required defaults to false on a cross-machine surface
- [a2a_fleet] HIGH: remove invented disable() hook — loader never calls it, port leaks on reload
- [a2a_fleet] HIGH: plugin.yaml missing kind / provides_tools / requires_env (token env undeclared)
- [a2a_fleet] MEDIUM: tighten wide-open CORS, anonymous /health peer leak, and peer-URL SSRF
- [a2a_fleet] MEDIUM: relocate tests to tests/plugins/ and cover sync-register + auth-default paths
- xai-oauth auxiliary client incorrectly uses Responses API (CodexAuxiliaryClient), causing 403 on compression/vision/web_extract
- [Bug]: Direct Copilot gpt-5.5 large resumes are killed by 12s Codex TTFB watchdog
- [Bug]: `hermes uninstall` does not work on Windows
- TUI: Thinking block leaks raw JSON and Σ character
- Hostinger VPS: migration Hermes Agent → Hermes WebUI impossible (tini + UID mismatch + sessions)
- /goal judge over-continues exploratory goals unless the assistant explicitly says the goal is complete
- /goal auto-continuation can be amplified by preflight compression/session split and resurrect stale task state
- Dashboard infinite reload loop in loopback mode — GET /api/auth/me returns 401 on every page load
- [Bug]: Provider/LLM switch leaves stale encrypted_content causing 400 errors on Telegram sessions
- [Bug]: Infinite reload loop / React state loop on Sessions tab (Firefox + Chrome) — repeated 401 on /api/auth/me (v0.15.0)
- show_reasoning should work independently of streaming in CLI mode
- Feature Request: Strip reasoning/<think> blocks from TTS preprocessing
- mcp add / mcp test raise NameError when mcp package not installed
- v0.14.0 dashboard breaks behind reverse proxies — two regressions
- Skills hub creates empty category directories when no skills installed
- [Bug]: Custom endpoint: ChatCompletions returns content, but Hermes treats response as empty (v0.14.0)
- fix: atomic_replace() fails with EXDEV when HERMES_HOME is a cross-filesystem symlink
- fix(gateway): Feishu session cancellation orphans session guard, permanently blocking messages
- Custom endpoint pricing can overestimate Crof qwen3.5-9b cost by 1,000,000x
- MCP OAuth callback: module-level port global causes port collisions and structural weaknesses vs upstream
- Bug: send_message tool bypasses validate_media_delivery_path security check
- Proposal: Add Mnemosyne to official memory provider documentation
- feat(swarm): support custom verifier/synthesizer body + skills
- Template conversion failed
- Error occurred in the operation of the agent node in the workflow.
- PubSub client overrides Sentinel client when REDIS_USE_SENTINEL is enabled
- Frontend description of the Retrieval node output does not match the actual output
- JSON type input var raise Intenal server error
- cannot extract elements from a scalar
- 负载均衡 为模型配置多组凭据,并自动调用,此功能无法选择
- add models is error
- panic: could not create filter
- Persist partially generated messages when /chat-messages/:task_id/stop is called
- MCP server connection fails with 403 — request never leaves Dify (SSRF proxy suspected)
- Support durable async execution backends for long-running workflow steps
- [Xiaomi MiMo] Credentials validation fails with 400 "Not supported model mimo-v2-flash" when using Token Plan endpoint (v0.0.7)
- After clicking preview on a parent-child segmented knowledge base, it shows 0 chunks
- Retrieval score differs between UI upload (.docx) and API upload (.txt) despite identical chunk content and embedding model
- gemini cli crash again
- Xbox gift card code damage
- Damage caused by the gemini cli crash
- ioctl(2) failed, EBADF (Bad File Descriptor)
- Feat: Support Bun as an alternative runtime/package manager for updates and extensions
- fatal error again!!!!
- ioctl error
- Critical Crash: ioctl(2) failed, EBADF in ShellExecutionService.resizePty
- ioctl(2) failed, EBADF
- v0.44.0 Regression: Critical crash with ioctl(2) failed, EBADF during PTY resize
- Crash on startup: ioctl(2) failed, EBADF in UnixTerminal.resize
- Crash: `ioctl(2) failed, EBADF` in `node-pty` during PTY resize on macOS
- Gemini CLI crashes with `ioctl(2) failed, EBADF` in `node-pty` during `resizePty`
- Remote Role
- ERROR ioctl(2) failed, EBADF /home/mich
- RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
- EBADF Error during folder creationg broke session and terminal glitches
- MAIP / Gargoub Project - Mediterania - North Coast
- Gemini cli crash again in this morning
- ERROR ioctl(2) failed, EBADF
- Verified node install fails — Checksum verification failed (Cloud)
- The extended debugging key did not arrive during registration.
- CollaborationPane unmounts collaboration store on single-user instances, causing permanent "No network connection" state
- Workflow cannot be saved when the name contains "->" (Potentially malicious string)
- automation does not work and does not show an error
- Raj Ai Automation
- Default Data Loader: DOMMatrix is not defined error
- Feature: Per-node execution timestamp overlay on canvas during workflow run
- AI Agent + Vertex `gemini-3.5-flash`: 400 "missing thought_signature" on sequential multi-turn tool calls (post-#24982)
- PDF Loader in Pinecone Vector Store fails due to pdf-parse version conflict (v2 not supported)
- emailReadImap: add UID deduplication, batch size cap, and numeric uid enforcement
- Manual node execution fails with "Could not find a node" when autosave is disabled (N8N_WORKFLOWS_AUTOSAVE_DISABLED)
- Schedule Trigger stopped firing — workflow Published & active, manual executions succeed, no automated fires for 2+ hours
- [MCP SDK] create_workflow_from_code intermittently returns HTTP 500, often as a false negative (workflow persists anyway, causing duplicates on retry)
- Credential-load wedge: workflows using googleApi/jwtAuth credentials silently fail to execute after key rotation
- Google Sheets Trigger every minute is not working manual Execute is working sent email
- [BUG] Plugin marketplace MCP connector remains stuck "still connecting" when mcp-remote requires OAuth
- [redacted at user request]
- Opus 4.7 behavioral regression: loaded instruction-following discipline degraded in recent Claude Code/Cowork updates
- [BUG] Tailscale via Homebrew CLI + Mac App Store GUI, both Macs on macOS, Cowork blocked by VPN detector despite Tailscale being a mesh VPN with no traffic interception
- stopShellPty on tab switch kills active sessions (exit 143) — regression in May 27 build
- [BUG] Long URLs are broken into multiple lines and become unclickable in terminal output
- [BUG] claude rm/stop/reap SIGKILLs background session tree without SIGTERM grace, orphaning git index.lock and similar
- [BUG] Default git workflow in the system prompt was pushed without context or consent
- [MODEL] Inconsistent output quality / Ignoring instructions (overfitting and inappropriate repetition of Korean vocabulary)
- You've hit your weekly limit · resets May 31 at 5pm (Asia/Shanghai)
- Paid yearly subscription silently downgraded to Free with no user action
- [Regression v2.1.153] Plugin bash hooks fail with "echo: write error: Permission denied" on Windows (claude-mem, shell: "bash")
- [BUG] Connector toggles in conversation are not clickable — must click text label instead
- [remote-control] Input from mobile app/browser not reaching host session — output works fine
- Model fails to read/reference CLAUDE.md contents despite being loaded in context
- [BUG] Claude Desktop reinstall destroys Code chat history (transcripts + Recents) while regular Chat history, project files, and memory all survive
- Bypass mode clamps to Accept Edits even with the toggle ON (Claude Code Desktop 1.9255.2 / CC 2.1.149)
- [BUG] TUI input freezes randomly mid-typing — entire prompt becomes unresponsive for minutes
- [BUG] Cowork downloads Linux ELF binary instead of macOS binary on macOS Sonoma 14.8.7 — exit code 132 (SIGILL) on every session
- [Feature Request] Persistent project memory — sessions forget everything on close, forcing users to keep many sessions open
- [Bug] Thread context stale after sleep/resume, returns outdated date and calendar data
- [FEATURE] Add context window usage indicator and warning before auto-compaction
- [BUG] Dictation error: Invalid character in header content ["x-config-keyterms"] on Windows
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: Server rate limiting despite normal usage
- Does delegating work to `claude -p` subprocesses reduce context accumulation in the parent session?
- [BUG] Claude Code hangs on M1 Mac when terminal says "opening browser to sign in" and browser opens
- [BUG] Claude_Preview MCP preview_start spawns dev server with main-repo cwd instead of session's worktree cwd
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: Server rate limiting during request execution
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: Server rate limiting on concurrent requests
- [Bug] Ultraplan ready notification fires before cloud agent completes execution
- [BUG] API 500 ERROR ALL THROUGHOUT THE DAY
- [BUG] Cowork: Live Artifacts folder path changed in 1.9255.2, no automatic migration from Documents\Claude\Artifacts
- [Bug] Auto-compact never triggers despite statusline reporting "100% context used" (v2.1.153, Max sub, 200K mode)
- [BUG] [Desktop / macOS] 'Open in → New Window' detached session: font renders smaller than main, no per-window controls, Cmd+/Cmd- keystrokes routed to main window instead
- Feature request: option to switch between classic and new minimal UI
- [Feature Request] Show timestamps for each message
- [BUG] Terminal corruption when permission prompt appears while navigating Agent Teams agent selection menu
- [FEATURE] Allow users to customize the background color of the Claude desktop app beyond the current light/dark theme presets.
- [BUG] Statusline not displaying on Windows [fixed]
- Background agent UI Stop button is a no-op for stuck agents — process keeps consuming tokens
- Background agents silently die on session pause/resume — no completion notification, no work recovery
- Add option to hide email address from welcome banner
- [BUG] SSH Remote: `projects` field in remote ~/.claude.json becomes null after desktop restart — jsonl files intact, UI shows 'No messages yet' for every session
- [Bug] Claude Code not applying fixes despite claiming to complete tasks
- billing is unfair and poorly documented
- [BUG] Claude Code on the web: declared plugins inactive on first session, require restart to fully load
- [BUG] Restore from archive deleted sessions instead of restoring them
- [BUG] M365 connector fails with AADSTS50011 in Cowork — localhost vs 127.0.0.1 redirect URI mismatch
- claude agents: workflow slash-commands missing from dispatch-input completion (regression-adjacent to #61424)
- Claude Desktop's Info.plist missing TCC usage strings, blocks all EventKit-based MCP servers
- False-positive safety blocks on self-administered governance amendments — request for owner-authority mode for verified professional users
- [BUG] Stop pushing "AUTO"-mode
- [DOCS] Plugin marketplace guide omits `skipLfs` option for git-based sources
- [DOCS] MCP docs omit combined startup notification for MCP server and connector authentication
- [DOCS] Agent view docs omit macOS Privacy & Security identity for background agents
- [DOCS] Npm update docs do not explain release-channel behavior for `claude update`
- [DOCS] Agent SDK docs omit `subagent_type: "claude"` worktree and output persistence behavior
- [DOCS] Background session docs omit `$CLAUDE_JOB_DIR` temp-file behavior
- [FR] mask env-var values in 'claude mcp get <server>' output
- [FR] subagent worktrees should not inherit stale local 'user.email' from prior dispatches
- [BUG] Windows: Grep tool leaks rg.exe + conhost.exe processes (~2000 zombies / 14 GB RAM in long sessions)
- [BUG] Stats dashboard "Peak hour" appears off by one hour
- [BUG] Diff highlight (teal SGR background) bleeds past changed text in 2.1.150–2.1.153
- [FEATURE] confirm before deleting session
- Plugin PostToolUse hooks still silently skip in Claude Desktop / Cowork (re-filing closed #51904)
- /code-review skill: silent fallback to main...HEAD reviews other people's commits, and JSON-only output is hard to read
- Monitor tool doesn't source the shell snapshot like Bash does; PATH-dependent tools (jq, sleep, etc.) fail in Monitor commands on macOS/Nix
- [Bug] Long input lines truncated with ellipsis while typing instead of wrapping in terminal UI
- [FEATURE] VS Code extension: Render submitted user messages as Markdown in chat
- OSC 52 copy from Claude TUI doesn't reach clipboard inside tmux (regression in 2.1.146–2.1.153)
- [BUG] RemoteTrigger create/update returns HTTP 400 with circular error: "event_type is required" / "unknown field event_type"
- [BUG] Option to hide or minimize the built-in "status footer" (multi-line debug/cost panel) [re-raise of #31475]
- [Bug] Feedback submissions being closed without review or action
- [FEATURE] Word-jump cursor navigation in Chat input (option+arrow / bindable actions)
- [FEATURE] ! shell mode: filesystem tab completion
- [BUG] API Error: Usage credits required for 1M context
- claude agents: OSC 52 clipboard emission broken in tmux (regression in 2.1.146–2.1.153)
- CLI crashes on macOS 15 M3 - exit code 1
- [FEATURE] Support Cmd+V image paste from clipboard
- [FEATURE] Enhance claude.ai M365 connector to support MS Planner
- [BUG] Slash command autocomplete hijacks pasted absolute file paths starting with /
- PreToolUse hook `if` filter false-positives on complex Bash commands
- [BUG] Diff panel hangs/whites out
- Feature Request: Support drag-and-drop for binary documents (.wps, .doc, .docx, .xlsx, .pdf) in VS Code extension
- [BUG] activation of 1M context in VSCode
- [FEATURE] Support i18n / language localization for built-in slash command outputs
- Ctrl+V para colar imagens deixou de funcionar no CLI (Windows, PowerShell)
- [FEATURE] Please add Norwegian (Bokmål/Nynorsk) language support to the Claude Code interface
- [BUG] OTel log events (claude_code.user_prompt, api_request_body, tool_decision, hook_execution_complete) emitted with empty trace_id/span_id while sibling spans correlate correctly
- [BUG] Cowork crashes on every message, no VM logs generated, missing AppData\Roaming\Claude
- [FEATURE] first-class session handoff + per-session token budgets for unattended runs
- [FEATURE] Smart paste: convert clipboard code to file reference chips (like Cursor)
- [Feature Request] Restore chat pin functionality to title chat submenu
- [BUG] SIGILL issues with version 2.1.153
- [BUG] Cowork plugin upload fails with generic "Plugin validation failed" when a `description` field in any SKILL.md frontmatter contains angle brackets (`<…>`)
- [BUG] Desktop App 2.1.144+: startup scanner deletes cliSessionId from claude-code-sessions local files on every launch — session not found on disk
- [Feature Request] Add keyboard shortcut to copy last message with proper formatting
- [MODEL] Opus 4.7 not 1M
- Allow naming/renaming background agents in `claude agents` view
- Stale worktrees in .claude/worktrees/ are never cleaned up, consuming massive disk space
- Agent worktrees are never cleaned up, silently consuming disk space
- Subagent worktrees not auto-cleaned when reviewer writes scratch files
- [Bug] Skill initialization hangs for extended duration in Plan Mode
- Claude Desktop writes malformed registry Run entry (nested escaped quotes) - crashes Windows Task Manager and other Run-key parsers
- IME candidate window shows at bottom-right corner instead of caret position (Windows CMD)
- [BUG] Pressing 'Escape' doesn't close the /BTW conversation when the main conversation is asking for approval
- [BUG] Opus 4.7 (1M) intermittently emits empty-string values for tool_use.input fields, killing the session
- FleetView agent UI shows "running" with incrementing elapsed time after agent has returned
- /doctor flags context-scoped cmd+c binding as macOS conflict (false positive)
- [BUG] Text Rendering in Elvish
- Desktop app: Bypass Permissions mode flips to Accept Edits on first prompt (M5 / macOS 26.5)
- [Workaround] Date-Weekday Verification Hook — Prevents Claude from writing wrong weekdays
- [BUG] Claude Code create c:/memfs directory without asking me.
- [BUG] Claude Code's Bash execution waits forever with no processes running
- [BUG] usage stays stuck waiting for 5 hr limit after upgrading to premium seat in team plan
- [Workflow tool] resume cache is unreachable for nontrivial workflows because LLM dispatchers can't transcribe args byte-exactly
- Code review (Preview): "Add a repository" shows no results for private GitHub org repos
- [BUG] /context commands blows up context
- [Feature Request] Add precache expiry hook to enable proactive compaction before token eviction
- [BUG] Context indicator shows 0% at session start despite ~20K+ tokens already loaded
- [Feature Request] Add semantic search for --resume session history
- [Feature Request] Add session search, tagging, and filtering capabilities
- [BUG] Cowork Dispatch reports "desktop not available" on Windows 11 while standard Cowork works normally
- [Bug] Claude Code provides incorrect suggestions with high confidence despite errors
- defaultMode: acceptEdits silently overrides per-path permissions.ask rules for Write/Edit
- [FEATUR configurable tip interval (e.g. tipIntervalSeconds: 30 in settings)E]
- Plugin marketplace fails to load: schema rejects 'displayName' key (v2.1.153)
- claude agents: in-session copy uses broken OSC 52 path while overview correctly uses tmux buffer
- [BUG] Plugin agent descriptions (and custom agents) load unconditionally into context — no parity with disable-model-invocation for skills
- Crashed ultrareview consumed a free credit despite producing zero findings
- [Bug] Character rendering issue - invisible or missing text display
- [BUG] Cowork: processo Claude Code encerra com código 3 — .claude.json não contém token de autenticação (Windows 11 25H2)
- [BUG] 2.1.153 silently discards tools/list response from rmcp 0.12.0 HTTP MCP server (works in 2.1.152, wire-identical handshake)
- VS Code extension: option to auto-resume last session when reopening a workspace folder
- [Bug] Conversation continuation failure
- [BUG] Cowork crashes every time I start a new chat or attempt to continue an existing one in any project. The error displayed is: "Claude Code è andato in crash
- [Bug] Unannounced quota changes
- Native update/install fails with 'socket connection was closed unexpectedly' behind proxy — undici TLS incompatibility
- [BUG] Session name reverting after manual change
- [BUG] 非正常思考,上下文过长时,一直显示思考,点击interrupt按钮失效
- Honor `tools:` frontmatter when an agent is invoked via `@mention` — strip `Task` only when the agent did not declare it
- macOS TCC popup still recurring on v2.1.153 — "2.1.153" would like to access data from other apps
- Claude Code leaks pty handles — exhausts pseudo-terminals on macOS after long session
- [Bug] Agent fails to execute or respond to user input
- [BUG] Persistent "Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)" JSON parse error after tool execution
- [Feature Request] Implement proactive unit test coverage recommendations for recurring bugs
- VS Code panel lacks status line + terminal lacks image paste in Codespaces, forcing a tradeoff
- `/powerup` only shows ~10 lessons — allow viewing the full catalog
- [Bug] Context contamination after auto-compact with unrelated email draft of Tejo/Sado Basin
- [Bug] VSCode terminal output displays corrupted text with garbled symbols
- [Feature Request] Add LaTeX/KaTeX math rendering to TUI
- [Bug] Sub-agent PR review results not validated by orchestrating agent
- Subagents on Pro 1M tier: trivial probes pass, real workloads fail at first tool call (probe-vs-workload divergence)
- Path-scoped rules and subdirectory CLAUDE.md not loaded when creating new files matching the pattern
- AskUserQuestion: cancelling during extended thinking poisons the whole session with 400 'thinking blocks cannot be modified' (2.1.153); concurrent prompts overwrite each other
- Ideas Missing from Claude Cowork Menu (Windows)
- [BUG_BOUNTY_SAFE_POC_2026] Prompt Injection RCE Test - Command Execution Proof
- [BUG] Cowork scheduled task: execution history row not showing after successful run
- Resuming an extended-thinking session fails permanently with 400 "thinking blocks cannot be modified" (transcript stores thinking text as empty but keeps signature)
- [Bug] Plugin-registered CwdChanged and FileChanged hooks don't fire (settings.json works) — v2.1.153
- Auto-archive on PR merge / branch delete — clarify autoArchiveSessions semantics or add dedicated opt-out
- `claude mcp add` echoes Authorization header value verbatim to stdout, leaks bearer tokens to terminal and session transcripts
- [BUG] Bug report — /insights skill, Claude Code The /insights skill outputs a malformed file path.
- Plugin slash commands render with '*'-inline format instead of two-column, despite matching official plugin shape
- [Bug] Unexpected long text generation without user input or goal
- [Bug] Thinking blocks causing task progression blocked without user modification
- [BUG] (Critical!) contamination by an unknown session simirlar to the report => [Bug] Context contamination after auto-compact with unrelated email draft of Tejo/Sado Basin #63137
- [Critical] Opus 4.7 Korean output degeneration — Korean grammar itself collapses in long contexts
- [BUG] Title: Autocompact buffer persists across /clear — wastes tokens for irrelevant old context
- [Bug] Auto-Compact loses user input before processing in conversation history
- Feature: per-invocation effort parameter + runtime session-config introspection for skills
- Auto-mode classifier mislabels Azure DevOps vote -5 as "Reject" when denying PR vote actions
- [BUG] Claude Desktop and Claude Code CLI never re-register MCP tools after OAuth 2.1 handshake on a remote HTTP server
- [BUG] Workspace file tags leak across sessions
- [BUG] Ink renderer crashes on Windows 11 build 26200 (Canary) duplicate banners, terminal mode leaks, mid-operation aborts
- [BUG] Claude Code Desktop issue
- PTY master fd leak in Claude desktop app exhausts macOS kern.tty.ptmx_max after ~2-3 days
- [BUG] Claude Code — Session Management after Unexpected Interruption
- [Windows] Cowork OpenTelemetry exporter does not initialize - zero events emitted to any destination, including loopback
- [Bug] Opus 4.7: 400 `thinking blocks ... cannot be modified` on long extended-thinking sessions, triggered by history-altering events (scheduled prompts / parallel tool-call cancellation)
- [BUG] API Error: Server is temporarily limiting requests (not your usage limit) · Rate limited
- Multi-plugin custom marketplace: only first plugin registered in installed_plugins.json, skills don't load
- [BUG] Git push through the SDK's git proxy fan-outs into ~500 GitHub REST API calls, exhausting the 5,000/hour budget after a handful of pushes
- [BUG] Claude took liberties it really shouldn't with my global config
- [BUG] Agent window focus lost after navigating with arrow keys, causing scroll deadlock
- [BUG] `--model` flag silently ignored in interactive sessions (works in `--print` only)
- [BUG] Dispatch permanently shows "desktop appears offline" on Windows 11 - never worked on first use
- feat: support per-command enableWeakerNetworkIsolation as safer alternative to dangerouslyDisableSandbox
- /code-review outputs a raw JSON array instead of readable findings
- [BUG] Cowork — Additional allowed domains ignored on Team plan; same domain works on Pro plan
- Haiku
- [Bug] False positive blocking beneficial outcomes in tool execution
- 3P Bedrock SSO: credentials silently expire without triggering re-auth on day 2+
- CLAUDE_AUTOCOMPACT_PCT_OVERRIDE in settings.json env block silently ignored by autocompact logic
- Auto-compaction deletes main session JSONL before verifying summary completion, causing data loss
- [Bug] Claude Code not executing stated actions or producing expected results
- [FEATURE] Deferred Messages — Queue Input for End of Turn
- [BUG] Up/Down arrows in input box navigate history instead of moving cursor — regression in 2.1.149+
- Cancelling a parallel tool-call batch corrupts thinking blocks -> 400 "thinking blocks cannot be modified" permanently wedges the session
- Claude Code caused data loss, then contradicted itself about recovery (two incidents, one session)
- [Bug] Unclear error messages from Claude Code CLI
- [Bug] Agent tool rejecting due to context size limit exceeded
- claude agents: daemon and bg-spare processes spin at ~100% CPU when idle
- [BUG] Compaction fails with "context window limit" error even when context usage is low (e.g., 20%) — regression in v2.1.153
- Remote Control entitlement lost after May 27-28 incident — `Error: Remote Control is not yet enabled for your account` on active Max subscription
- PreToolUse hook exit code 2 does not block Write tool
- [Bug] Thinking blocks in latest assistant message are immutable
- GUI: dispatch file:// and custom-scheme clicks to OS shell handler
- Show current model in statusLine by default
- [Bug] Agent console becomes unresponsive to keyboard input after multiple agents initialized
- [FEATURE] PreToolUse hooks should have a way of updating the environment
- [Bug] Unable to start or use Claude Code CLI
- [BUG] Repository not visible in Claude Code web repo picker
- Session permanently wedged on 400 "thinking blocks cannot be modified" after parallel tool_results
- [Bug] @ autocomplete loses sibling repos after a file edit in multi-repo workspace
- Unclear error message when creating sub-agent without authentication
- [Bug] Anthropic API errors causing frequent failures and high token usage
- [BUG] @ mention file picker only shows packages, not individual files (desktop app - Code tab)
- [Bug] TUI panel footer remains sticky and consumes excessive terminal space
- PR-status polling exhausts GitHub GraphQL rate limit on repos with many open PRs
- [BUG] Windows: welcome panel not shown in some project folders (2.1.153)
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: thinking blocks corrupted during context compaction with extended thinking enabled
- API 400 "thinking blocks cannot be modified" permanently bricks session during agent activation (interleaved thinking + tool use)
- Right-click Copy copies the whole message instead of the selection; pasted text retains dark background
- Mid-session model switch corrupts conversation when extended thinking is enabled (API 400: 'thinking blocks cannot be modified')
- [BUG] Markdown file links in chat output do not open files when clicked (VS Code extension)
- Stuck retry loop: `400 thinking blocks cannot be modified` on large interleaved-thinking turns using AskUserQuestion
- [FEATURE] Prompt user for approval before auto-compaction proceeds
- Custom MCP connectors not attachable to scheduled routines — no UUID discovery path
- [BUG] Claude in Chrome — Navigation blocked for teams.cloud.microsoft and outlook.cloud.microsoft after Microsoft domain migration**
- [BUG] Claude Desktop — Personal plugins panel renders list but is entirely non-interactive (macOS, v1.9255.2)
- [Bug] error when using Workflows
- [BUG] Persistent "update available" notification despite being on latest version
- [BUG] Sweep Agent from /code-review never completes
- [Bug] Tool calls not executing or returning results
- [FEATURE] Cloud-synced memory and settings across machines
- [Bug] Terminal UI freezes when Ctrl+O view exits during interactive prompt in plan mode
- Continuous api errors when using claude code with Opus 4.7 with thinking on low
- [Feature Request] Add support for installing and using previous Claude Code versions
- [Bug] Extended Thinking: Summarized thinking blocks fail signature validation when resent to API
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: 'thinking' blocks cannot be modified
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: Thinking blocks cannot be modified with extended thinking mode
- Feature request: Lazy/on-demand MCP server connections
- [Bug] Tool Arguments Parsed as String Instead of Object
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: Insufficient context provided
- [Bug] Claude Opus occasionally uses moskovian(russian) orthography instead of Ukrainian in system-prompted responses
- Opus 4.8: backgrounded task completions (subagents AND Bash) crash with 400 "thinking blocks cannot be modified"
- [Bug] Opus 4.7 fabricates stable preferences ("my default") to rationalize arbitrary choices when challenged
- [Bug] Unable to update Claude Code CLI
- [BUG] Desktop app: /remote-control mints link + connects bridge (main.log) but in-chat link/QR panel never renders
- Feature: sessionColor and sessionName in .claude/settings.json
- [BUG] Anthropic API error: thinking blocks
- [FEATURE] Support Remote MCPs in Cowork as in Claude Code
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: 400 Bad Request with Redacted Thinking - 0 4.7 & 4.8
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: Cannot modify thinking blocks from different model versions
- Interleaved thinking + multi-tool turn corrupts thinking block (text blanked, signature kept) → permanent 400 'blocks must remain as they were'
- [BUG] Mode/permission changes mid-tool-loop (effortLevel: xhigh) poisons entire session
- Session failure log: Opus 4.6 ignores its own rules for an entire session
- [BUG] "400 Guardrail was enabled" error when using Claude Opus 4.8 with AWS Bedrock
- [Feature Request] Add subagent approach selection option to avoid accidental feedback
- Persistent 400 'thinking blocks in the latest assistant message cannot be modified' — interleaved thinking persisted with empty text + signature bricks sessions
- [BUG] DesktopvsApp
- [BUG] Opus 4.7 cache hit rate collapse after May 27 incident — Messages 1.1k→88.9k in 9 minutes, $630/session
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: Invalid thinking block format
- [BUG] FUCK CLAUDE
- Opus 4.8 extended thinking: Stop hook block re-entry corrupts thinking blocks → 400
- [Bug] 4.8 Fails when accessing previous model history
- [Bug] Unintended File Modifications During Execution
- [DOCS] Model configuration docs omit lean system prompt default scope and model exceptions
- Add "Always allow globally" option to permission prompts
- Server-side model upgrade (Opus 4.7→4.8) wedges in-flight sessions with `thinking blocks cannot be modified` 400
- [DOCS] AskUserQuestion docs missing multiple-choice prompt decision threshold
- [DOCS] Agent view docs omit shell-command background session launch syntax
- [DOCS] Agent view dispatch input docs incorrectly imply `/logout` dispatches as a prompt
- [DOCS] Claude in Chrome docs omit connected-browser selection behavior
- [DOCS] Plugin docs omit `defaultEnabled: false` for opt-in plugins
- Feature Request: Customizable chat text colors for user and assistant messages
- [DOCS] `/plugin` Discover tab docs omit directory-based suggested plugin pins
- VSCode Chrome integration silently fails: 3 distinct bugs
- [DOCS] MCP stdio docs omit session environment variables
- [Bug] Anthropic API error on second request within session with Claude Opus 4.8
- Cowork emits a blank session "index" handoff on focus when a CLI session is paused awaiting input
- [DOCS] MCP docs omit `claude mcp list/get` pending-approval output for unapproved project servers
- [BUG] /compact fails with 400 error when last assistant turn contains thinking blocks
- [DOCS] `/claude-api` docs omit Opus 4.8 migration guidance
- [DOCS] Fast mode docs still recommend deprecated Opus 4.6 override variable
- [DOCS] Bash tool docs omit `$TMPDIR` consistency across sandboxed and unsandboxed commands
- [Bug] Anthropic API Error: 400 Bad Request on Extended Thinking
- [DOCS] Background session docs omit worktree-isolation behavior for spawned subagents
- Built-in mechanistic self-verification of verifiable claims (symmetric to the auto permission gate)
- [DOCS] Worktree docs do not clarify `worktree.baseRef: "head"` inside linked worktrees
- [BUG] Excessive RAM usage with multiple parallel chats (~10 sessions → 30 GB memory pressure, macOS OOM)
- [DOCS] Managed MCP policy docs omit invalid `allowedMcpServers`/`deniedMcpServers` entry behavior
- [DOCS] Effort docs omit `CLAUDE_CODE_ALWAYS_ENABLE_EFFORT` unsupported-model behavior
- Regression (2.1.147–2.1.150?): resuming an extended-thinking session after a CC update/model-switch → unrecoverable 400, session bricked
- [DOCS] Windows updater docs omit `claude.exe` in-use recovery guidance
- [DOCS] VS Code auto mode docs still tie mode-picker visibility to bypass-permissions setting
- [DOCS] MCP docs omit `/mcp` tool list and detail rendering behavior
- [DOCS] Fine-grained tool streaming docs still describe provider opt-in behavior
- bypassPermissions: session startup reads flat pref, GUI toggle writes per-account pref — they never sync
- [BUG] Claude Desktop Code tab causes disk write limit violation — 8.5GB in 11 min, macOS kills app (M5, v1.9659.1)
- Ultrareview v2.1.96: docs describe /tasks command + claude ultrareview --json subcommand that don't exist; findings hard to read after completion
- I'd be happy to help create a GitHub issue title, but I don't see the error message in your message. Could you please share the specific error you're encountering? That way I can generate an accurate and descriptive issue title for you.
- [BUG] Claude in Chrome `file_upload` rejects all scheduled-task sessions with misleading error (real cause: INVALID_SESSION)
- Extended thinking: signed thinking block 'cannot be modified' (400) permanently wedges session
- RTL text support for Hebrew (and Arabic) in Claude Code
- [Bug] Random errors occurring across multiple operations