openclaw - 💡(How to fix) Fix [Bug]: Heartbeat fires in Telegram group session, causes permanent delivery failure

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Version: 2026.5.7

What happened: A heartbeat event fired inside a Telegram group session (agent:main:telegram:group:-5281106145) instead of the main session. The group agent correctly responded with HEARTBEAT_OK, but OpenClaw saved this as pendingFinalDelivery: "HEARTBEAT_OK" in sessions.json. This delivery never completed and the session became permanently stuck — all subsequent responses were generated (visible in session transcript and trajectory) but never delivered to Telegram (sendMessage was never called).

Error Message

• /tmp/openclaw/openclaw-2026-05-11.log • /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/agents/main/sessions/5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742.jsonl

{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"} {"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"} {"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"} {"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"} {"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}} {"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11810",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"} {"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}} {"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}} {"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "results": [\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 104,\n "endLine": 134,\n "score": 0.6210692473379429,\n "vectorScore": 0.4907763600349426,\n "textScore": 0.9250859843782768,\n "snippet": "- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md",\n "startLine": 152,\n "endLine": 178,\n "score": 0.6055836816220297,\n "vectorScore": 0.4671666622161865,\n "textScore": 0.9285567269023308,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 81,\n "endLine": 111,\n "score": 0.588598970746109,\n "vectorScore": 0.4425526261329651,\n "textScore": 0.9293737748434447,\n "snippet": "What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md",\n "startLine": 127,\n "endLine": 150,\n "score": 0.5498446918436315,\n "vectorScore": 0.3958108425140381,\n "textScore": 0.9092570069460162,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/2026-04-22.md",\n "startLine": 93,\n "endLine": 114,\n "score": 0.3859822154045105,\n "vectorScore": 0.5514031648635864,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": "- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md",\n "startLine": 122,\n "endLine": 144,\n "score": 0.3742120653390884,\n "vectorScore": 0.5345886647701263,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n }\n ],\n "provider": "openai",\n "model": "text-embedding-3-small",\n "citations": "auto",\n "debug": {\n "backend": "builtin",\n "effectiveMode": "n/a",\n "searchMs": 4172,\n "hits": 6\n }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as "just noise to silence"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\"open\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: "used systemd idiot"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}} {"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}} {"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}} {"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}} {"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}} {"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\"); [print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}} {"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}} {"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\")\n print(f\" {c.get('detail','')}\")\n if c.get('recommendation'):\n print(f\" Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\")\n print()\n"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}} {"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}} {"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}} {"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}} {"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to groupPolicy=\"open\" on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 groupPolicy="open" on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy="open" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and define channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}} {"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ok": true,\n "messageId": "11812",\n "chatId": "-5281106145"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}} {"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}} {"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"} {"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}} {"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11814",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"} {"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy="open" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from groupPolicy=\"open\" to groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"\n2. Set groupAllowFrom to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+

Root Cause

{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"} {"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"} {"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"} {"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"} {"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}} {"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11810",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"} {"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}} {"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}} {"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "results": [\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 104,\n "endLine": 134,\n "score": 0.6210692473379429,\n "vectorScore": 0.4907763600349426,\n "textScore": 0.9250859843782768,\n "snippet": "- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md",\n "startLine": 152,\n "endLine": 178,\n "score": 0.6055836816220297,\n "vectorScore": 0.4671666622161865,\n "textScore": 0.9285567269023308,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 81,\n "endLine": 111,\n "score": 0.588598970746109,\n "vectorScore": 0.4425526261329651,\n "textScore": 0.9293737748434447,\n "snippet": "What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md",\n "startLine": 127,\n "endLine": 150,\n "score": 0.5498446918436315,\n "vectorScore": 0.3958108425140381,\n "textScore": 0.9092570069460162,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/2026-04-22.md",\n "startLine": 93,\n "endLine": 114,\n "score": 0.3859822154045105,\n "vectorScore": 0.5514031648635864,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": "- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md",\n "startLine": 122,\n "endLine": 144,\n "score": 0.3742120653390884,\n "vectorScore": 0.5345886647701263,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n }\n ],\n "provider": "openai",\n "model": "text-embedding-3-small",\n "citations": "auto",\n "debug": {\n "backend": "builtin",\n "effectiveMode": "n/a",\n "searchMs": 4172,\n "hits": 6\n }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as "just noise to silence"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\"open\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: "used systemd idiot"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}} {"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}} {"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}} {"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}} {"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}} {"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\"); [print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}} {"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}} {"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\")\n print(f\" {c.get('detail','')}\")\n if c.get('recommendation'):\n print(f\" Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\")\n print()\n"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}} {"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}} {"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}} {"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}} {"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to groupPolicy=\"open\" on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 groupPolicy="open" on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy="open" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and define channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}} {"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ok": true,\n "messageId": "11812",\n "chatId": "-5281106145"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}} {"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}} {"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"} {"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}} {"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11814",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"} {"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy="open" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from groupPolicy=\"open\" to groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"\n2. Set groupAllowFrom to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+

Fix Action

Fix / Workaround

{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"} {"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"} {"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"} {"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"} {"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}} {"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11810",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"} {"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}} {"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns "audit".\n at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}} {"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "results": [\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 104,\n "endLine": 134,\n "score": 0.6210692473379429,\n "vectorScore": 0.4907763600349426,\n "textScore": 0.9250859843782768,\n "snippet": "- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md",\n "startLine": 152,\n "endLine": 178,\n "score": 0.6055836816220297,\n "vectorScore": 0.4671666622161865,\n "textScore": 0.9285567269023308,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "MEMORY.md",\n "startLine": 81,\n "endLine": 111,\n "score": 0.588598970746109,\n "vectorScore": 0.4425526261329651,\n "textScore": 0.9293737748434447,\n "snippet": "What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md",\n "startLine": 127,\n "endLine": 150,\n "score": 0.5498446918436315,\n "vectorScore": 0.3958108425140381,\n "textScore": 0.9092570069460162,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/2026-04-22.md",\n "startLine": 93,\n "endLine": 114,\n "score": 0.3859822154045105,\n "vectorScore": 0.5514031648635864,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": "- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n },\n {\n "path": "memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md",\n "startLine": 122,\n "endLine": 144,\n "score": 0.3742120653390884,\n "vectorScore": 0.5345886647701263,\n "textScore": 0,\n "snippet": " - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3",\n "source": "memory",\n "corpus": "memory"\n }\n ],\n "provider": "openai",\n "model": "text-embedding-3-small",\n "citations": "auto",\n "debug": {\n "backend": "builtin",\n "effectiveMode": "n/a",\n "searchMs": 4172,\n "hits": 6\n }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as "just noise to silence"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\nWhat happened:\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- groupPolicy=\"open\" + elevated tools = any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\nThe lesson:\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"What I did wrong:\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed run_preplan.py directly with pkill/kill\n- I did not check whether PrePlan was managed by systemd\n- Kevin immediately called it out: "used systemd idiot"\n\nWhy this matters:\n- If a service is managed by systemd, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\nThe rule:\n1. Check for service management first (systemctl status ..., user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has 2026.4.26 available via openclaw update status. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":" - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-.json, parse summary.critical and\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n - confidence: 0.58\n - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n - recalls: 0\n - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}} {"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about "Critical audits found??" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}} {"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}} {"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}} {"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}} {"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\"); [print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}} {"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}} {"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c "\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n print(f\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\")\n print(f\" {c.get('detail','')}\")\n if c.get('recommendation'):\n print(f\" Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\")\n print()\n"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}} {"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}} {"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}} {"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n "ts": 1778512181399,\n "summary": {\n "critical": 3,\n "warn": 3,\n "info": 1\n },\n "findings": [\n {\n "checkId": "summary.attack_surface",\n "severity": "info",\n "title": "Attack surface summary",\n "detail": "groups: open=1, allowlist=0\ntools.elevated: enabled\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\nhooks.internal: disabled\nbrowser control: enabled\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway"\n },\n {\n "checkId": "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",\n "detail": "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",\n "remediation": "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.",\n "remediation": "Set groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed",\n "detail": "Found groupPolicy=\"open\" at:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.",\n "remediation": "For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\"messaging\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\" for exposed agents."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)",\n "detail": "Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"open\"\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.",\n "remediation": "If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs",\n "severity": "warn",\n "title": "Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs",\n "detail": "Unpinned plugin index install records:\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)",\n "remediation": "Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, @scope/[email protected]) for higher supply-chain stability."\n },\n {\n "checkId": "channels.telegram.warning.1",\n "severity": "critical",\n "title": "Telegram security warning",\n "detail": "Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders."\n }\n ],\n "deep": {\n "gateway": {\n "attempted": true,\n "url": "ws://127.0.0.1:18789",\n "ok": true,\n "error": null,\n "close": null\n }\n },\n "secretDiagnostics": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}} {"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to groupPolicy=\"open\" on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 groupPolicy="open" on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy="open" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\" and define channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}} {"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n "ok": true,\n "messageId": "11812",\n "chatId": "-5281106145"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}} {"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}} {"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"} {"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}} {"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "chat_id": "telegram:-5281106145",\n "message_id": "11814",\n "sender_id": "8094726582",\n "conversation_label": "OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145",\n "sender": "Kevin Melberger",\n "timestamp": "Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT",\n "group_subject": "OpenClaw Config",\n "is_group_chat": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n "label": "Kevin Melberger (8094726582)",\n "id": "8094726582",\n "name": "Kevin Melberger",\n "username": "Kevin_IBT"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"} {"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy="open" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from groupPolicy=\"open\" to groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"\n2. Set groupAllowFrom to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+

Code Example

/tmp/openclaw/openclaw-2026-05-11.log
/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/agents/main/sessions/5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742.jsonl

{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"}
{"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"}
{"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"}
{"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n  \"chat_id\": \"telegram:-5281106145\",\n  \"message_id\": \"11810\",\n  \"sender_id\": \"8094726582\",\n  \"conversation_label\": \"OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145\",\n  \"sender\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n  \"timestamp\": \"Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT\",\n  \"group_subject\": \"OpenClaw Config\",\n  \"is_group_chat\": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n  \"label\": \"Kevin Melberger (8094726582)\",\n  \"id\": \"8094726582\",\n  \"name\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n  \"username\": \"Kevin_IBT\"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about \"Critical audits found??\" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}}
{"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns \"audit\".\n    at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n    at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n    at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns \"audit\".\n    at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n    at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n    at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n  \"results\": [\n    {\n      \"path\": \"MEMORY.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 104,\n      \"endLine\": 134,\n      \"score\": 0.6210692473379429,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.4907763600349426,\n      \"textScore\": 0.9250859843782768,\n      \"snippet\": \"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \\\"just noise to silence\\\"\\n- Gave a command without reading current config\\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\\n\\n**What happened:**\\n- Kevin ran the command\\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\\n- `groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"` + elevated tools = **any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands**\\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\\n\\n**The lesson:**\\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\\n- I read them \",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 152,\n      \"endLine\": 178,\n      \"score\": 0.6055836816220297,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.4671666622161865,\n      \"textScore\": 0.9285567269023308,\n      \"snippet\": \"  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"MEMORY.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 81,\n      \"endLine\": 111,\n      \"score\": 0.588598970746109,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.4425526261329651,\n      \"textScore\": 0.9293737748434447,\n      \"snippet\": \"**What I did wrong:**\\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\\n- I killed `run_preplan.py` directly with `pkill`/`kill`\\n- I did **not** check whether PrePlan was managed by `systemd`\\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \\\"used systemd idiot\\\"\\n\\n**Why this matters:**\\n- If a service is managed by `systemd`, the correct control point is the service unit\\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\\n\\n**The rule:**\\n1. **Check for service management first** (`systemctl status ...`, user service if a\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 127,\n      \"endLine\": 150,\n      \"score\": 0.5498446918436315,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.3958108425140381,\n      \"textScore\": 0.9092570069460162,\n      \"snippet\": \"  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has `2026.4.26` available via `openclaw update status`. - Local security audit looked basi\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"memory/2026-04-22.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 93,\n      \"endLine\": 114,\n      \"score\": 0.3859822154045105,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.5514031648635864,\n      \"textScore\": 0,\n      \"snippet\": \"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 122,\n      \"endLine\": 144,\n      \"score\": 0.3742120653390884,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.5345886647701263,\n      \"textScore\": 0,\n      \"snippet\": \"  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"provider\": \"openai\",\n  \"model\": \"text-embedding-3-small\",\n  \"citations\": \"auto\",\n  \"debug\": {\n    \"backend\": \"builtin\",\n    \"effectiveMode\": \"n/a\",\n    \"searchMs\": 4172,\n    \"hits\": 6\n  }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\n**What happened:**\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- `groupPolicy=\"open\"` + elevated tools = **any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands**\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\n**The lesson:**\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":"  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"**What I did wrong:**\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed `run_preplan.py` directly with `pkill`/`kill`\n- I did **not** check whether PrePlan was managed by `systemd`\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\n**Why this matters:**\n- If a service is managed by `systemd`, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\n**The rule:**\n1. **Check for service management first** (`systemctl status ...`, user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":"  - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has `2026.4.26` available via `openclaw update status`. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":"  - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about \"Critical audits found??\" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}}
{"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}}
{"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}}
{"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}}
{"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c \"import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\\\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\\\"); [print(f\\\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\\\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]\"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}}
{"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}}
{"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c \"\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n    print(f\\\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\\\")\n    print(f\\\"  {c.get('detail','')}\\\")\n    if c.get('recommendation'):\n        print(f\\\"  Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\\\")\n    print()\n\"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}}
{"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}}
{"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}}
{"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n    \"ts\": 1778512181399,\n    \"summary\": {\n        \"critical\": 3,\n        \"warn\": 3,\n        \"info\": 1\n    },\n    \"findings\": [\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"summary.attack_surface\",\n            \"severity\": \"info\",\n            \"title\": \"Attack surface summary\",\n            \"detail\": \"groups: open=1, allowlist=0\\ntools.elevated: enabled\\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\\nhooks.internal: disabled\\nbrowser control: enabled\\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"gateway.trusted_proxies_missing\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Reverse proxy headers are not trusted\",\n            \"detail\": \"gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled\",\n            \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Set groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed\",\n            \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\\\"messaging\\\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\" for exposed agents.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)\",\n            \"detail\": \"Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"\\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs\",\n            \"detail\": \"Unpinned plugin index install records:\\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/[email protected]`) for higher supply-chain stability.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"channels.telegram.warning.1\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Telegram security warning\",\n            \"detail\": \"Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders.\"\n        }\n    ],\n    \"deep\": {\n        \"gateway\": {\n            \"attempted\": true,\n            \"url\": \"ws://127.0.0.1:18789\",\n            \"ok\": true,\n            \"error\": null,\n            \"close\": null\n        }\n    },\n    \"secretDiagnostics\": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n    \"ts\": 1778512181399,\n    \"summary\": {\n        \"critical\": 3,\n        \"warn\": 3,\n        \"info\": 1\n    },\n    \"findings\": [\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"summary.attack_surface\",\n            \"severity\": \"info\",\n            \"title\": \"Attack surface summary\",\n            \"detail\": \"groups: open=1, allowlist=0\\ntools.elevated: enabled\\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\\nhooks.internal: disabled\\nbrowser control: enabled\\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"gateway.trusted_proxies_missing\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Reverse proxy headers are not trusted\",\n            \"detail\": \"gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled\",\n            \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Set groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed\",\n            \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\\\"messaging\\\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\" for exposed agents.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)\",\n            \"detail\": \"Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"\\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs\",\n            \"detail\": \"Unpinned plugin index install records:\\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/[email protected]`) for higher supply-chain stability.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"channels.telegram.warning.1\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Telegram security warning\",\n            \"detail\": \"Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders.\"\n        }\n    ],\n    \"deep\": {\n        \"gateway\": {\n            \"attempted\": true,\n            \"url\": \"ws://127.0.0.1:18789\",\n            \"ok\": true,\n            \"error\": null,\n            \"close\": null\n        }\n    },\n    \"secretDiagnostics\": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}}
{"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to `groupPolicy=\"open\"` on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 **groupPolicy=\"open\"** on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set `channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"` and define `channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom` with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}}
{"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n  \"ok\": true,\n  \"messageId\": \"11812\",\n  \"chatId\": \"-5281106145\"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}}
{"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}}
{"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n  \"chat_id\": \"telegram:-5281106145\",\n  \"message_id\": \"11814\",\n  \"sender_id\": \"8094726582\",\n  \"conversation_label\": \"OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145\",\n  \"sender\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n  \"timestamp\": \"Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT\",\n  \"group_subject\": \"OpenClaw Config\",\n  \"is_group_chat\": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n  \"label\": \"Kevin Melberger (8094726582)\",\n  \"id\": \"8094726582\",\n  \"name\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n  \"username\": \"Kevin_IBT\"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy=\"open\" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from `groupPolicy=\"open\"` to `groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"`\n2. Set `groupAllowFrom` to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+
RAW_BUFFERClick to expand / collapse

Bug type

Behavior bug (incorrect output/state without crash)

Beta release blocker

No

Summary

Version: 2026.5.7

What happened: A heartbeat event fired inside a Telegram group session (agent:main:telegram:group:-5281106145) instead of the main session. The group agent correctly responded with HEARTBEAT_OK, but OpenClaw saved this as pendingFinalDelivery: "HEARTBEAT_OK" in sessions.json. This delivery never completed and the session became permanently stuck — all subsequent responses were generated (visible in session transcript and trajectory) but never delivered to Telegram (sendMessage was never called).

Steps to reproduce

Steps to reproduce (observed conditions, not guaranteed):

  1. Have an active Telegram group session with recent message history
  2. Run a jq command to modify groupPolicy in openclaw.json while the group session is active
  3. OpenClaw detects config change and attempts a deferred channel reload (logged: "config change requires channel reload — deferring until operations complete")
  4. Gateway times out during the reload (logged: "Failed with result 'timeout'")
  5. Gateway restarts automatically
  6. On restart, heartbeat fires inside the group session instead of main session
  7. Group session responds HEARTBEAT_OK
  8. sessions.json records pendingFinalDelivery: true, pendingFinalDeliveryText: "HEARTBEAT_OK"
  9. Delivery gets permanently stuck — all subsequent group responses silently dropped

Note: The exact trigger for heartbeat misfiring into the group session is unknown. It may be related to the gateway timeout + config reload race condition. We cannot guarantee these steps reproduce it reliably.

Expected behavior

  1. Have a Telegram group session active
  2. Heartbeat fires at the wrong time (appears to target the group session instead of main)
  3. Group session responds HEARTBEAT_OK
  4. pendingFinalDelivery: true, pendingFinalDeliveryText: "HEARTBEAT_OK" persists in sessions.json
  5. Gateway restart does not clear it (flag survives restart from disk)
  6. All future group messages: model runs, response generated, but no Telegram delivery

Actual behavior

Telegram group OpenClaw Config (-5281106145) stopped delivering responses. The bot showed a "typing" indicator in Telegram when messages were sent, confirming the session was triggered. The session transcript confirms the model ran and generated a response (e.g., "Still here. 👍", 9 output tokens). The trajectory log shows model.completed → trace.artifacts → session.ended with no delivery step. Gateway logs show zero sendMessage calls to chat -5281106145. The sessions.json entry for that group contained pendingFinalDelivery: true, pendingFinalDeliveryText: "HEARTBEAT_OK". A gateway restart did not resolve it — the flag persisted on disk. Clearing the flag via jq also did not restore delivery. The only fix was deleting the session entry from sessions.json entirely, forcing a fresh session on the next message.

OpenClaw version

2026.5.7

Operating system

AWS Linux 2023 Graviton (ARM)

Install method

install -g openclaw

Model

anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6

Provider / routing chain

openclaw -> anthropic (direct, token auth)

Additional provider/model setup details

Default route: openclaw -> anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6 via anthropic:default (token auth). Fallbacks configured: openai-codex/gpt-5.4, openai/gpt-5.4. Config: ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json under agents.defaults.model. No proxy or AI gateway in use. Direct Anthropic API.

Logs, screenshots, and evidence

• /tmp/openclaw/openclaw-2026-05-11.log
• /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/agents/main/sessions/5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742.jsonl

{"type":"session","version":3,"id":"5262a5b4-308a-40ca-8632-fe7f0bb28742","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:09.519Z","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"}
{"type":"model_change","id":"a1d65247","parentId":null,"timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"}
{"type":"thinking_level_change","id":"0e0c2713","parentId":"a1d65247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.666Z","thinkingLevel":"medium"}
{"type":"custom","customType":"model-snapshot","data":{"timestamp":1778512150681,"provider":"anthropic","modelApi":"anthropic-messages","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"ce267c60","parentId":"0e0c2713","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.681Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"46cce7f2","parentId":"ce267c60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.713Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical audits found??"}],"timestamp":1778512150707}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n  \"chat_id\": \"telegram:-5281106145\",\n  \"message_id\": \"11810\",\n  \"sender_id\": \"8094726582\",\n  \"conversation_label\": \"OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145\",\n  \"sender\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n  \"timestamp\": \"Mon 2026-05-11 11:09 EDT\",\n  \"group_subject\": \"OpenClaw Config\",\n  \"is_group_chat\": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n  \"label\": \"Kevin Melberger (8094726582)\",\n  \"id\": \"8094726582\",\n  \"name\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n  \"username\": \"Kevin_IBT\"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"15145c18","parentId":"46cce7f2","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:10.715Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"bb2736f9","parentId":"15145c18","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:16.445Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about \"Critical audits found??\" - this seems to be referring to some audit that was run. Let me check what's going on - maybe he's referring to a security audit, OpenClaw audit, or something else. Let me check recent memory and also run a quick status check.\n\nGiven the context, this might be about the OpenClaw security audit that's referenced in MEMORY.md (Rule 5 about the groupPolicy security warning). Or it could be about something more recent.\n\nLet me check the current status and recent memory files.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"openclaw audit 2>&1 | head -60","timeout":15}},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","name":"memory_search","arguments":{"query":"critical audit security warning"}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":3,"output":252,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":32165,"totalTokens":32420,"cost":{"input":0.000009,"output":0.00378,"cacheRead":0,"cacheWrite":0.12061875,"total":0.12440775}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512150716,"responseId":"msg_012cWGFg5raB4YiLvnXVHvvX"}}
{"type":"message","id":"e95cd5b5","parentId":"bb2736f9","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.777Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_018Uqz47JR43sgTANKYJEQxR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns \"audit\".\n    at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n    at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n    at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":4079,"aggregated":"[openclaw] Failed to start CLI: Error: Unknown command: openclaw audit. No built-in command or plugin CLI metadata owns \"audit\".\n    at runCli (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/cli/run-main.js:310:29)\n    at async runMainOrRootHelp (file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:468:3)\n    at async file:///home/ec2-user/.npm-global/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist/entry.js:438:55","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"d8247853","parentId":"e95cd5b5","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:20.778Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01RLHLwEmfYqU9j2yZZDjZyJ","toolName":"memory_search","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n  \"results\": [\n    {\n      \"path\": \"MEMORY.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 104,\n      \"endLine\": 134,\n      \"score\": 0.6210692473379429,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.4907763600349426,\n      \"textScore\": 0.9250859843782768,\n      \"snippet\": \"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \\\"just noise to silence\\\"\\n- Gave a command without reading current config\\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\\n\\n**What happened:**\\n- Kevin ran the command\\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\\n- `groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"` + elevated tools = **any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands**\\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\\n\\n**The lesson:**\\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\\n- I read them \",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 152,\n      \"endLine\": 178,\n      \"score\": 0.6055836816220297,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.4671666622161865,\n      \"textScore\": 0.9285567269023308,\n      \"snippet\": \"  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"MEMORY.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 81,\n      \"endLine\": 111,\n      \"score\": 0.588598970746109,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.4425526261329651,\n      \"textScore\": 0.9293737748434447,\n      \"snippet\": \"**What I did wrong:**\\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\\n- I killed `run_preplan.py` directly with `pkill`/`kill`\\n- I did **not** check whether PrePlan was managed by `systemd`\\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \\\"used systemd idiot\\\"\\n\\n**Why this matters:**\\n- If a service is managed by `systemd`, the correct control point is the service unit\\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\\n\\n**The rule:**\\n1. **Check for service management first** (`systemctl status ...`, user service if a\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 127,\n      \"endLine\": 150,\n      \"score\": 0.5498446918436315,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.3958108425140381,\n      \"textScore\": 0.9092570069460162,\n      \"snippet\": \"  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has `2026.4.26` available via `openclaw update status`. - Local security audit looked basi\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"memory/2026-04-22.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 93,\n      \"endLine\": 114,\n      \"score\": 0.3859822154045105,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.5514031648635864,\n      \"textScore\": 0,\n      \"snippet\": \"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"path\": \"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md\",\n      \"startLine\": 122,\n      \"endLine\": 144,\n      \"score\": 0.3742120653390884,\n      \"vectorScore\": 0.5345886647701263,\n      \"textScore\": 0,\n      \"snippet\": \"  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\\n  - confidence: 0.58\\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\\n  - recalls: 0\\n  - status: staged\\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3\",\n      \"source\": \"memory\",\n      \"corpus\": \"memory\"\n    }\n  ],\n  \"provider\": \"openai\",\n  \"model\": \"text-embedding-3-small\",\n  \"citations\": \"auto\",\n  \"debug\": {\n    \"backend\": \"builtin\",\n    \"effectiveMode\": \"n/a\",\n    \"searchMs\": 4172,\n    \"hits\": 6\n  }\n}"}],"details":{"results":[{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":104,"endLine":134,"score":0.6210692473379429,"vectorScore":0.4907763600349426,"textScore":0.9250859843782768,"snippet":"- Treated a CRITICAL security warning as \"just noise to silence\"\n- Gave a command without reading current config\n- Didn't check if elevated tools were enabled (they were)\n- Ignored Security Principles in MEMORY.md (lines 235-243) that I had already read\n\n**What happened:**\n- Kevin ran the command\n- OpenClaw security audit immediately flagged 3 CRITICAL issues\n- `groupPolicy=\"open\"` + elevated tools = **any Telegram group member could trigger elevated commands**\n- This created a real prompt injection risk with sudo access\n- Kevin caught it and reverted immediately\n\n**The lesson:**\nThis is the SAME pattern as Rule 1 (test before claiming success):\n- I have the rules in MEMORY.md\n- I read them ","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-05-06.md","startLine":152,"endLine":178,"score":0.6055836816220297,"vectorScore":0.4671666622161865,"textScore":0.9285567269023308,"snippet":"  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and report the results.\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:26-26\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs/security/\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-05-04.txt:27-27\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: System (untrusted): [2026-05-04 09:04:34 EDT] Exec completed (tide-ree, code 0) :: Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260504-130353.txt Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260504-130353.json An a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"MEMORY.md","startLine":81,"endLine":111,"score":0.588598970746109,"vectorScore":0.4425526261329651,"textScore":0.9293737748434447,"snippet":"**What I did wrong:**\n- Kevin told me to stop PrePlan\n- I killed `run_preplan.py` directly with `pkill`/`kill`\n- I did **not** check whether PrePlan was managed by `systemd`\n- Kevin immediately called it out: \"used systemd idiot\"\n\n**Why this matters:**\n- If a service is managed by `systemd`, the correct control point is the service unit\n- Killing the child process directly is sloppy and can leave the service manager confused or auto-restarting\n- It bypasses the normal stop path, logs, restart policy, and operator expectations\n- Kevin expects infrastructure discipline, not ad-hoc process murder\n\n**The rule:**\n1. **Check for service management first** (`systemctl status ...`, user service if a","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-30.md","startLine":127,"endLine":150,"score":0.5498446918436315,"vectorScore":0.3958108425140381,"textScore":0.9092570069460162,"snippet":"  - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: Considering updating to latest version of openclaw Are there any issues that you can find on their github? [Bootstrap truncation warning] Some workspace bootstrap files were truncated before injection. Treat Project Context as partial and read the relevant files directly if\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-28.txt:10-10\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Kevin, I checked both your local status and recent GitHub noise. Short version: I’d be cautious about updating immediately. What I found: - Your install has `2026.4.26` available via `openclaw update status`. - Local security audit looked basi","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/2026-04-22.md","startLine":93,"endLine":114,"score":0.3859822154045105,"vectorScore":0.5514031648635864,"textScore":0,"snippet":"- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:57-57\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-21.txt:58-58\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3. Full logs in docs","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"},{"path":"memory/dreaming/light/2026-04-28.md","startLine":122,"endLine":144,"score":0.3742120653390884,"vectorScore":0.5345886647701263,"textScore":0,"snippet":"  - status: staged\n- Candidate: User: [cron:a976adc2-f05d-47a1-84a8-90333cdd6957 healthcheck:security-audit] Run /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh. Then read the most recent JSON file in /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security named audit-*.json, parse summary.critical and\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:21-21\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: I'll run the security audit script and then analyze the results.\n  - confidence: 0.58\n  - evidence: memory/.dreams/session-corpus/2026-04-27.txt:22-22\n  - recalls: 0\n  - status: staged\n- Candidate: Assistant: Security audit: critical=0, warn=3","source":"memory","corpus":"memory"}],"provider":"openai","model":"text-embedding-3-small","citations":"auto","debug":{"backend":"builtin","effectiveMode":"n/a","searchMs":4172,"hits":6}},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512160777}}
{"type":"message","id":"61b606d1","parentId":"d8247853","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:24.295Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin is asking about \"Critical audits found??\" - he might be referring to the healthcheck security audit script that we have running. Let me run the audit script to get the latest results.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"bash /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/healthcheck_audit.sh 2>&1 | tail -30","timeout":30}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":153,"cacheRead":32165,"cacheWrite":2526,"totalTokens":34845,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.002295,"cacheRead":0.0096495,"cacheWrite":0.0094725,"total":0.02142}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512160779,"responseId":"msg_01BiShbeQBDvheTz5yqBARdG"}}
{"type":"message","id":"2317a185","parentId":"61b606d1","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:34.325Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01W172ApFoKbJaVKkHz3Mno1","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Command still running (session amber-shore, pid 27465). Use process (list/poll/log/write/kill/clear/remove) for follow-up."}],"details":{"status":"running","sessionId":"amber-shore","pid":27465,"startedAt":1778512164308,"cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace","tail":""},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512174325}}
{"type":"message","id":"0b164405","parentId":"2317a185","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:37.355Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","name":"process","arguments":{"action":"poll","sessionId":"amber-shore","timeout":25000}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":89,"cacheRead":34691,"cacheWrite":200,"totalTokens":34981,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.001335,"cacheRead":0.0104073,"cacheWrite":0.00075,"total":0.0124953}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512174326,"responseId":"msg_015pkHe4KwNonQQxU2E9JWiJ"}}
{"type":"message","id":"3e6a1f6b","parentId":"0b164405","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:41.633Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_015h3VTSzoqNy7oWpsqoEsXp","toolName":"process","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n\nProcess exited with code 0."}],"details":{"status":"completed","sessionId":"amber-shore","exitCode":0,"aggregated":"Wrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/host-20260511-150924.txt\nWrote: /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json\n","name":"bash /home/ec2-user/.opencl...s/healthcheck_audit.sh"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512181632}}
{"type":"message","id":"ed0e1b59","parentId":"3e6a1f6b","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.675Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c \"import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); s=d.get('summary',{}); checks=d.get('checks',[]); print(f\\\"Critical: {s.get('critical',0)}, Warn: {s.get('warn',0)}, OK: {s.get('ok',0)}\\\"); [print(f\\\"[{c['severity']}] {c['id']}: {c['detail']}\\\") for c in checks if c['severity'] in ('critical','warn')]\"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":221,"cacheRead":34891,"cacheWrite":170,"totalTokens":35283,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0033150000000000002,"cacheRead":0.010467299999999999,"cacheWrite":0.0006375,"total":0.0144228}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512181634,"responseId":"msg_01WM1dUZtHMmeDRLEBAa6y5U"}}
{"type":"message","id":"cb370b60","parentId":"ed0e1b59","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:45.737Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01B7mkRmx2XwFYUuPVSNw6ZJ","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":38,"aggregated":"Critical: 3, Warn: 3, OK: 0","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512185736}}
{"type":"message","id":"a82478d4","parentId":"cb370b60","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.396Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The summary shows 3 critical issues. Let me get more details.","thinkingSignature":"EvoBClsIDRgCKkDOGE1MEU+D9kqXAMbjuiNpL9Bt6qjSIYetlDl6I4WP0BGMgGzSo9XmxeNeI1BI7Sbxgt5vpr6FWtklewoK7ihIMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgyQKHSNfAmWGxqEEQoaDM2ZM1QW4wqfe01YpiIwLvSd0EKln7UyX8WCL8kdU3440IA2ps4R0yAlc9+aJ0F+Jq4TaGXC87/rE2AGxdhkKk1BPRjkgsYG+1WbdRWK695qU9fsSUl7sLP7eZOIWuxtaNpHxXyZfOtbR1hzOCGgh9JehgdDlSHjGHacKUw0pJrxZeo3lAa6ufp/3LoWaxgB"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -c \"\nimport json,sys\nd=json.load(sys.stdin)\nchecks=d.get('checks',[])\nfor c in checks:\n    print(f\\\"[{c['severity']}] {c.get('id','?')}\\\")\n    print(f\\\"  {c.get('detail','')}\\\")\n    if c.get('recommendation'):\n        print(f\\\"  Rec: {c.get('recommendation','')}\\\")\n    print()\n\"","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":242,"cacheRead":35061,"cacheWrite":248,"totalTokens":35552,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00363,"cacheRead":0.0105183,"cacheWrite":0.00093,"total":0.015081299999999999}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512185738,"responseId":"msg_0132AcVtixVuqnn4396g1bYf"}}
{"type":"message","id":"c49506fc","parentId":"a82478d4","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:49.449Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01Pz3isMx6nccTmd4vNewWEo","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"(no output)"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":35,"aggregated":"","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512189448}}
{"type":"message","id":"2ad7d5da","parentId":"c49506fc","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.808Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","name":"exec","arguments":{"command":"cat /home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace/docs/security/audit-20260511-150924.json | python3 -m json.tool | head -100","timeout":10}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":108,"cacheRead":35309,"cacheWrite":256,"totalTokens":35674,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.0016200000000000001,"cacheRead":0.0105927,"cacheWrite":0.00096,"total":0.0131757}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512189450,"responseId":"msg_019YXqQR3TXruJj8AgTF5yiD"}}
{"type":"message","id":"79833305","parentId":"2ad7d5da","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:09:51.893Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01XcQcSsS5yxbBv75Db9L2JR","toolName":"exec","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n    \"ts\": 1778512181399,\n    \"summary\": {\n        \"critical\": 3,\n        \"warn\": 3,\n        \"info\": 1\n    },\n    \"findings\": [\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"summary.attack_surface\",\n            \"severity\": \"info\",\n            \"title\": \"Attack surface summary\",\n            \"detail\": \"groups: open=1, allowlist=0\\ntools.elevated: enabled\\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\\nhooks.internal: disabled\\nbrowser control: enabled\\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"gateway.trusted_proxies_missing\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Reverse proxy headers are not trusted\",\n            \"detail\": \"gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled\",\n            \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Set groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed\",\n            \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\\\"messaging\\\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\" for exposed agents.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)\",\n            \"detail\": \"Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"\\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs\",\n            \"detail\": \"Unpinned plugin index install records:\\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/[email protected]`) for higher supply-chain stability.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"channels.telegram.warning.1\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Telegram security warning\",\n            \"detail\": \"Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders.\"\n        }\n    ],\n    \"deep\": {\n        \"gateway\": {\n            \"attempted\": true,\n            \"url\": \"ws://127.0.0.1:18789\",\n            \"ok\": true,\n            \"error\": null,\n            \"close\": null\n        }\n    },\n    \"secretDiagnostics\": []\n}"}],"details":{"status":"completed","exitCode":0,"durationMs":66,"aggregated":"{\n    \"ts\": 1778512181399,\n    \"summary\": {\n        \"critical\": 3,\n        \"warn\": 3,\n        \"info\": 1\n    },\n    \"findings\": [\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"summary.attack_surface\",\n            \"severity\": \"info\",\n            \"title\": \"Attack surface summary\",\n            \"detail\": \"groups: open=1, allowlist=0\\ntools.elevated: enabled\\nhooks.webhooks: disabled\\nhooks.internal: disabled\\nbrowser control: enabled\\ntrust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"gateway.trusted_proxies_missing\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Reverse proxy headers are not trusted\",\n            \"detail\": \"gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled\",\n            \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Set groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed\",\n            \"detail\": \"Found groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" at:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy\\nRisky tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nPrompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"For open groups, prefer tools.profile=\\\"messaging\\\" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\" for exposed agents.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)\",\n            \"detail\": \"Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:\\n- channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\"\\nRuntime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.\\nPotential high-impact tool exposure contexts:\\n- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)\\nOpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.\",\n            \"remediation\": \"If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\\\"all\\\", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs\",\n            \"severity\": \"warn\",\n            \"title\": \"Plugin index includes unpinned npm specs\",\n            \"detail\": \"Unpinned plugin index install records:\\n- brave (@openclaw/brave-plugin)\",\n            \"remediation\": \"Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/[email protected]`) for higher supply-chain stability.\"\n        },\n        {\n            \"checkId\": \"channels.telegram.warning.1\",\n            \"severity\": \"critical\",\n            \"title\": \"Telegram security warning\",\n            \"detail\": \"Telegram groups: groupPolicy=\\\"open\\\" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\\\"allowlist\\\" + channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom to restrict senders.\"\n        }\n    ],\n    \"deep\": {\n        \"gateway\": {\n            \"attempted\": true,\n            \"url\": \"ws://127.0.0.1:18789\",\n            \"ok\": true,\n            \"error\": null,\n            \"close\": null\n        }\n    },\n    \"secretDiagnostics\": []\n}","cwd":"/home/ec2-user/.openclaw/workspace"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512191892}}
{"type":"message","id":"3da9a6cb","parentId":"79833305","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:00.627Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"The audit found 3 critical issues, all related to `groupPolicy=\"open\"` on Telegram. This is the same issue that was documented in MEMORY.md - the security risk of having open group policy with elevated tools.\n\nLet me explain this to Kevin clearly.","thinkingSignature":"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"},{"type":"toolCall","id":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","name":"message","arguments":{"action":"send","channel":"telegram","target":"-5281106145","message":"Just ran the audit — 3 critical + 3 warnings. All 3 criticals are the same root cause:\n\n🔴 **groupPolicy=\"open\"** on Telegram + elevated tools enabled\n\nThat combo means any member of your allowed Telegram groups can trigger elevated commands (exec, file writes, etc.) via prompt injection.\n\nThe 3 criticals are:\n1. Open groupPolicy + elevated tools enabled\n2. Open groupPolicy + runtime/filesystem tools exposed (exec, read, write, edit — no sandbox)\n3. Telegram-specific: groupPolicy=\"open\" allows any group member to trigger commands\n\nWarnings:\n- Reverse proxy headers not trusted (minor, gateway is loopback)\n- Multi-user heuristic triggered (same root cause as above)\n- Brave plugin spec is unpinned npm (supply chain hygiene)\n\nFix for all 3 criticals: set `channels.telegram.groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"` and define `channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom` with your authorized sender IDs.\n\nWant me to check your current config and propose the exact change? I'll show it to you before touching anything."}}],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":434,"cacheRead":35565,"cacheWrite":1269,"totalTokens":37269,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00651,"cacheRead":0.0106695,"cacheWrite":0.00475875,"total":0.02194125}},"stopReason":"toolUse","timestamp":1778512191894,"responseId":"msg_01QLrVPqFx2Wgn6rJqAUHYNF"}}
{"type":"message","id":"0bd0f247","parentId":"3da9a6cb","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:01.320Z","message":{"role":"toolResult","toolCallId":"toolu_01U8Ucmkr9pvKDN41ExeWtdr","toolName":"message","content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\n  \"ok\": true,\n  \"messageId\": \"11812\",\n  \"chatId\": \"-5281106145\"\n}"}],"details":{"ok":true,"messageId":"11812","chatId":"-5281106145"},"isError":false,"timestamp":1778512201319}}
{"type":"message","id":"c58afa39","parentId":"0bd0f247","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:02.867Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[],"api":"anthropic-messages","provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6","usage":{"input":1,"output":2,"cacheRead":36834,"cacheWrite":476,"totalTokens":37313,"cost":{"input":0.000003,"output":0.00003,"cacheRead":0.0110502,"cacheWrite":0.0017850000000000001,"total":0.0128682}},"stopReason":"stop","timestamp":1778512201321,"responseId":"msg_01FWy7aq1fN1rL8GEN5bgNN1"}}
{"type":"custom","customType":"openclaw.cache-ttl","data":{"timestamp":1778512203467,"provider":"anthropic","modelId":"claude-sonnet-4-6"},"id":"80dd6d85","parentId":"c58afa39","timestamp":"2026-05-11T15:10:03.467Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"23cdd0cd","parentId":"80dd6d85","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.514Z","message":{"role":"user","content":[{"type":"text","text":"So, Let me understand this. I have many Telegram Groups. Only 1 Group, Stock-Analysis has another Telegram User. All the rest of the groups are just assigned to me. How would we approach this critical fix configuration"}],"timestamp":1778531149508}}
{"type":"custom_message","customType":"openclaw.runtime-context","content":"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n  \"chat_id\": \"telegram:-5281106145\",\n  \"message_id\": \"11814\",\n  \"sender_id\": \"8094726582\",\n  \"conversation_label\": \"OpenClaw Config id:-5281106145\",\n  \"sender\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n  \"timestamp\": \"Mon 2026-05-11 16:25 EDT\",\n  \"group_subject\": \"OpenClaw Config\",\n  \"is_group_chat\": true\n}\n\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n\n{\n  \"label\": \"Kevin Melberger (8094726582)\",\n  \"id\": \"8094726582\",\n  \"name\": \"Kevin Melberger\",\n  \"username\": \"Kevin_IBT\"\n}\n","display":false,"details":{"source":"openclaw-runtime-context"},"id":"7d3b7359","parentId":"23cdd0cd","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:49.516Z"}
{"type":"message","id":"b31c4957","parentId":"7d3b7359","timestamp":"2026-05-11T20:25:57.123Z","message":{"role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"thinking","thinking":"Kevin wants to understand the approach to fix the groupPolicy security issue. Let me think about this carefully.\n\nThe situation:\n- Kevin has multiple Telegram groups\n- Most groups are just Kevin (solo)\n- Stock Analysis group has another Telegram user besides Kevin\n- Current config: groupPolicy=\"open\" which is the security risk\n\nThe fix approach:\n1. Switch from `groupPolicy=\"open\"` to `groupPolicy=\"allowlist\"`\n2. Set `groupAllowFrom` to restrict which senders can trigger commands\n\nFor the Stock Analysis group specifically (which has another user), we need to be careful - we'd allowlist only Kevin's sender ID (8094726582) in that group.\n\n\nNow I need to look at the current Telegram configuration to see what's actually set up right now.","thinkingSignature":"EocHClsIDRgCKkBQ5G3RJbx+6Fhc2l0kf+dAOjfO395BytTLLzgHizLz0JXIC2WbeIw/UAbobl8ToL+mEc3GuHfrarj81MIk5HJZMhFjbGF1ZGUtc29ubmV0LTQtNjgAEgx6HIE21GeFT9UXfCkaDLnQ5oE9mwieR8foJCIwPJNxXk8z1zW127KfglCWKB9ny+YFJNHxLKEfouBnnr/28ezxuFsyvxZ9IkAhIzGOKtkF6mZXORSzU+

Impact and severity

Affected: Any Telegram group session where a heartbeat fires during an active group session window.

Severity: High — the group session becomes permanently unresponsive with no visible error. The bot shows a typing indicator but never delivers a response.

Frequency: Intermittent. Occurred once on 2026-05-11 on version 2026.5.7. Conditions appear to require an active group session + heartbeat misfire coinciding.

Consequence: All subsequent messages to the affected group are silently dropped. Model runs,

Additional information

No response

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FAQ

Expected behavior

  1. Have a Telegram group session active
  2. Heartbeat fires at the wrong time (appears to target the group session instead of main)
  3. Group session responds HEARTBEAT_OK
  4. pendingFinalDelivery: true, pendingFinalDeliveryText: "HEARTBEAT_OK" persists in sessions.json
  5. Gateway restart does not clear it (flag survives restart from disk)
  6. All future group messages: model runs, response generated, but no Telegram delivery

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