openclaw - 💡(How to fix) Fix [Bug]: openviking plugin can leak agent context via shared mutable client agentId [3 comments, 3 participants]

Problem

The OpenClaw openviking context-engine plugin appears to use a shared mutable client whose agentId is reassigned per session/request.

This creates a concurrency risk: when multiple sessions or agents hit the shared client at the same time, one request can overwrite the agentId intended for another.

Why this matters

This is not just a correctness bug. It can break agent isolation and cause cross-agent memory leakage.

Potential outcomes:

• agent A reads memories intended for agent B
• agent A writes/extracts into agent B's space
• recall/capture behavior becomes nondeterministic under concurrency

Observed code shape

Local review of the OpenClaw openviking plugin showed this pattern across:

• index.ts
• context-engine.ts
• client.ts

The plugin caches/shares an OpenVikingClient, then mutates per-request identity via a method like:

client.setAgentId(resolvedAgentId)

and later reuses that same client for find/read/write/extract operations.

If another session changes the same client instance before the first request finishes, the wrong agentId can be applied.

Expected behavior

Agent identity should be request-scoped or instance-scoped, not shared mutable state.

Safer shapes include:

• pass agentId explicitly on each request
• construct a separate client per agent/session
• avoid mutable shared identity on the client object

Suggested fix direction

Option A

Make OpenVikingClient stateless with respect to agentId:

client.find(query, { agentId })
client.read(uri, { agentId })

Option B

Create one client instance per agent/session and never mutate shared client identity.

Impact level

This looks like a critical isolation bug for multi-agent / concurrent usage.

Single-user serial usage may hide it, but shared or concurrent workloads can surface cross-agent contamination.