ollama - 💡(How to fix) Fix CORS file://* origin combined with AllowWildcard=true — any local HTML file can access API

CWE-942: Overly Broad CORS Scheme Origins — file://, app://, tauri://*

Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS 5.3)

Location

envconfig/config.go — AllowedOrigins():

origins = append(origins,
    "app://*",
    "file://*",
    "tauri://*",
    "vscode-webview://*",
    "vscode-file://*",
)

Combined with routes.go:

corsConfig.AllowWildcard = true

Description

The CORS configuration uses wildcard scheme origins including file://* and app://*. The file://* origin is especially dangerous because:

1. Any HTML file opened from the local filesystem (via file:// protocol) can make authenticated cross-origin requests to Ollama
2. Malicious HTML files (e.g., downloaded from email, messaging apps, or malicious sites) that are opened locally can access the Ollama API
3. The AllowWildcard = true setting means credentials are sent with requests from any origin

Impact

A local attacker who can get a user to open an HTML file can:

• List all models (/api/tags)
• Run inference on any loaded model
• Pull new models
• Delete models
• Access experimental web search (SSRF amplification)

Remediation

// Remove file://* from allowed origins, or restrict to specific paths
// Consider requiring explicit opt-in for file:// origins
// At minimum, document the risk of file://* in the CORS configuration
origins = append(origins,
    "app://*",
    // "file://*",  // ← Remove this — too broad
    "tauri://*",
    "vscode-webview://*",
    "vscode-file://*",
)