hermes - 💡(How to fix) Fix Proposal: policy/audit authorization layer for Hermes tool execution

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Fix Action

Fix / Workaround

  • an external runtime plugin merged in datalayer/agent-runtimes
  • active LexFlow interop discussion around canonical audit logs
  • stdlib-only verifier helpers for JSONL hash-chain validation
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Hi Hermes maintainers,

I’m working on Agent_Sudo under the Kisyntra org: https://github.com/Kisyntra/Agent_Sudo

Agent_Sudo is a local permission gateway for AI agents focused on:

  • policy-based tool authorization
  • human approval workflows
  • scoped delegation
  • provenance-aware decisions
  • tamper-evident audit logs
  • portable audit verification helpers

I’m not opening a PR yet. I wanted to first ask whether this direction is aligned with Hermes’ goals.

The design question is:

Could Hermes benefit from an optional policy/audit layer that evaluates tool execution before native tools run, while Hermes continues to own the runtime, chat UX, session lifecycle, and approval UI?

The intended ownership split would be:

Hermes owns:

  • tool execution
  • chat-native approval UX
  • Telegram/Discord/Slack platform flows
  • session lifecycle
  • runtime sandboxing/headless behavior

Agent_Sudo owns:

  • policy evaluation
  • approval/delegation semantics
  • provenance-aware classification
  • canonical audit record semantics
  • tamper-evident verification tooling

This is not intended to replace Hermes’ existing approval UX, sandboxing, or tool execution model.

The key architectural idea is:

  • Hermes remains the execution/runtime owner.
  • Agent_Sudo acts only as a policy + audit verifier layer.
  • If policy allows, Hermes executes normally.
  • If policy denies, Hermes blocks.
  • If policy requires approval, Hermes could route that through its existing chat-native approval flow.

I’m especially interested in maintainer feedback on:

  1. Is this problem space useful for Hermes at all?
  2. Would an optional policy/audit layer be welcome, or would it conflict with Hermes’ architecture?
  3. Should this live as a plugin, core hook, external verifier, or not at all?
  4. What concerns would you have around licensing, maintenance burden, UX, or security boundaries?
  5. Would audit-log compatibility with external verifiers be useful for Hermes users?

For context, Agent_Sudo already has:

  • an external runtime plugin merged in datalayer/agent-runtimes
  • active LexFlow interop discussion around canonical audit logs
  • stdlib-only verifier helpers for JSONL hash-chain validation

I’d appreciate honest feedback before attempting any Hermes-specific integration work.

Thanks.

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hermes - 💡(How to fix) Fix Proposal: policy/audit authorization layer for Hermes tool execution